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Introduction
I.
International investment law-the set of rules and principles
governing how states treat foreign investors and investments within their
territories-has experienced remarkable growth over the past two
decades. While for much of the 20th century international investment
law was so clouded by conflict between developed, capital-exporting
states and developing, capital-importing states as to be of little utility in
promoting investment,' it has more recently been transformed into a
Attorney, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, Washington, DC. The author
wishes to express his sincere gratitude to Alan Birnbaum, formerly of the United
States Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, from whose enviable
imagination the core premise of this article was derived; Professor Detlev Vagts
of Harvard Law School, to whose incomparable judgment the article's present
form and emphasis is owed; and Professor Jeswald Salacuse of the Fletcher
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dynamic and evolving area of the law that is beginning to factor into the
global strategies of a number of businesses. This emergence from the
torrid darkness of theory into the thriving lucidity of practice is due
largely to the dramatic proliferation of bilateral investment treaties
(BITS). By prescribing and proscribing certain conduct on the part of
host states with respect to investors, investment treaties offer an
enhanced degree of clarity and specificity to the rules governing foreign
investment and enable more accurate calculation of risk, thereby
encouraging increased flows of foreign direct investment to developing
countries.2 Perhaps more importantly, modem investment treaties
typically empower foreign investors to enforce their own treatygenerated substantive rights by initiating international arbitral
proceedings directly against the host state.' Such proceedings, though
not entirely unprecedented in international law, 4 have raised the profile
of international investment law and ensured that scholars, activists and
government officials alike take very seriously the various rights and
duties it imposes. The system has also given rise to a growing number of
rather creative claims by investors.
One such claim arose in United Parcel Service of America, Inc
(UPS) v. Canada,5 an arbitration brought by a U.S. investor under the
North American Free Trade Agreement's (NAFTA's) Chapter 11.6 I
UPS, an American investor claimed that Canada had violated certain
treaty-based obligations by failing to enforce its own competition laws
School of Law and Diplomacy, on whose boundless expertise and generosity of
time the completion of the article has depended.

1See

M.

SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 8-

13 (1994) [hereinafter SORNARAJAH].
2 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment
Treaties,
41 HARV. INT'L L. J. 469,488-91 (2000) [hereinafter Vandevelde, Economics].
3 See Raul Emilio Vinuesa, BilateralInvestment Treaties and the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Under ICSID: The Latin American Experience, 8 L. & BUS.
REV. AM. 501 (2002);
4 See Barton Legurn, The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under
NAFTA, 43 HARV. INT'L L. J. 531 (2002) (noting similar dispute resolution
procedures conducted by, inter alia, the Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal, the
post-WWII Mixed Arbitral Tribunals hearing claims against Germany, and the
U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal).
5 UPS v. Canada, ICSID (W. Bank), Award on Jurisdiction (Nov. 22, 2002),
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com.
6 North American Free Trade Agreement, Ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992,
U.S.-Can.Mex., 32 I.L.M. 296 (1993).
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against the Canada Post Corporation, a state-owned mail delivery
service.7 This somewhat unusual claim differs in an important sense
from the typical investor-state dispute in that the investor is complaining
not merely about actions taken directly by the state against the investor
itself, but rather about the state's failure to take action to protect the
investor against the conduct of a third party.
The UPS case illustrates a little-noted but potentially radical
development in the field of international investment law: the shift from
negative to positive obligations. As explained in Part II, infra, the
traditional rules in international investment law have been generally
"negative" in character, requiring a host state to refrain from certain
conduct and disciplining wrongful acts. Obligations such as the one
suggested in UPS are "positive," requiring the state to act and prohibiting
wrongful omissions. Although positive obligations have to some extent
been present in international investment law from its very inception, they
have rarely been invoked outside of extreme circumstances involving
war or violent civil unrest. The positive obligation invoked in UPS,
however, involved review of the adequacy of a state's domestic
regulatory institutions, and a request that the state be sanctioned for
failing to constrain a third party's commercial activity. Such positive
obligations, if imposed regularly, could have even more significant
implications for state sovereignty than their negative counterparts, and
could raise a host of concerns involving the administrative capacity of
the states involved and the legitimacy of the investor-state dispute
resolution mechanism.
Moreover, claims based on this sort of positive obligation are
likely to be fueled by an additional trend in international economic law.
Both developed and developing states have participated in efforts to
harmonize, through multilateral agreements or the drafting of "model
laws," domestic law and regulations in a number of economic subject
areas.
These harmonization efforts, if successful in forming a
widespread consensus, can contribute to the development of customary
international law. This phenomenon is noteworthy because it is possible
that both the customary international norms and the multilateral
agreements themselves may be incorporated into BITs through the
application of specific, commonly used BIT provisions.
This
incorporation could thereby alter the content of key provisions of those
treaties.
Consequently, the combination of these harmonization
7 See

Amended Statement of Claim (UPS v. Canada), ICSID (W. Bank) at 1314, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com.
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programs and the BITs' incorporation and enforcement provisions could
engender a wave of investor-state arbitrations based on failure to
regulate, creating serious and unanticipated consequences for host states
and generating renewed controversy over the development of investment
protection standards.
This article will examine the legal basis for the development of
this positive obligation model and of the claims that investors may bring
under it. Part II of this article will provide a short background on the
development of international investment law and the basic function of
investment treaties. Part III will analyze two basic models of obligation
imposed by BITs on host states. A variety of standard BIT provisions
will be reviewed, with a particular focus on the "full protection and
security" clause, which provides the primary source of positive
obligation in most BITs. Part IV will examine the means by which
external legal rules can be incorporated into the BIT scheme through the
mechanisms of the most-favored-nation clause and the "minimum
treatment" clause.
Part V will review several areas in which
international efforts to harmonize domestic economic regulation may
generate standards enforceable against host states through investment
treaties as positive obligations. Part VI will consider the potential
consequences of such a shift in investment protection standards, as well
as measures that can be taken to minimize the potential drawbacks of this
development.
II.
Background on International Investment Law
A full understanding of the nature and significance of positive
obligations will be difficult to attain without at least a short introduction
to the field of international investment law. This Part will first define
and describe the economic phenomenon of foreign direct investment,
which constitutes the primary subject matter of international investment
law. It will then briefly recount the origins of the current investment law
regime, as well as the regime's essential elements.
A.

Definition and Characteristics of Foreign Direct Investment
The legal principles and instruments with which this article is
concerned focus on host states' treatment of those who are involved in
foreign direct investment ("FDI"). FDI has been generally defined by
one prominent commentator as "the transfer of tangible or intangible
assets from one country into another for the purpose of use in that
country to generate wealth under the total or partial control of the owner
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of the assets."8 Typically FDI involves the purchase or development of
productive facilities such as factories, mines, drilling platforms, or
offices, although it also includes ownership of subsidiary entities based
in the host state. In recent years "intangible" forms of FDI such as
patent, copyright, and trademark rights have comprised an increasing
portion of the value of total FDI flows.9 Significantly, FDI can be
distinguished from "portfolio" investment, in which the investor does not
maintain control over the management or use of the invested assets.' 0
Similarly, though more fundamentally, FDI can be distinguished from
simple cross-border trade in goods or services, though firms engaged in
such trade might elect to engage in FDI by setting up local
distributorships."
The basic FDI arrangement involves two states: the "home"
state, where investors maintain their nationality and the "host" state,
where the investments are physically located (or, in the case of intangible2
assets, the state in which the economic value of the assets is realized).
A "capital importing country" is one that tends to host more FDI from
foreign investors than its own investors send abroad. Accordingly, a
"capital exporting country" is a state whose FDI flows move in the
opposite direction. 3 Developing states are generally net importers of
FDI, and play the role of "host" in the typical foreign investment
supra note 1, at 4. The International Monetary Fund has offered
a similar definition of the term. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL, para. 408, at 136 (4th ed., 1977, reprinted in
8 SORNARAJAH,

1987). See also PAUL E. COMEAUx and N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF
POLITICAL RISK xix-xx (1997).
9 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 4, n.6; Ingo Selting, FDI and International
Protection of Intellectual Property, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT

205-206 (Daniel D. Bradlow and Alfred Escher, eds. 1999).

1o See Alfred Escher, Current Developments, Legal Challenges, and Definition
of FDI, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 20-21 (Daniel D.

Bradlow and Alfred Escher, eds. 1999). Escher classifies ownership of over 10%
of the voting rights in a foreign company as foreign direct investment, since
such a large voting block indicates an interest in being able to influence the
company's management decisions. Ownership of less than 10% is considered
portfolio investment for exactly the converse reason. Id. at 21.

" Id. at 21.

12 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 5.
'3

See id. at 8-20; S.K. Date-Bah, Facilitatingand Regulating PrivateInvestment

in at Developing Economy, 22 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 3, 8-11 (2003).
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transaction.' 4 Wealthier states have tended to be capital exporters,
although as noted infra some such states have also drawn huge inflows of
FDI and thus experienced firsthand some of the difficulties of host state
status. 5
FDI provides both benefits and costs for states.' 6 On the benefit
side, FDI is both provides an influx of wealth for those local producers17
supplying goods or services to the investors and creates new local jobs.
In addition, investors may contribute to the development of the host
state's physical infrastructure, introduce new and superior technology,
and provide individuals with valuable training and marketable skills.'" If
profitable, such investors may also enlarge the host state government's
tax base, enabling the expansion of public services and enhancing the
government's credit rating.' 9 On the other hand, FDI potentially
engenders corruption, contributes to the degradation of the environment,
and overwhelms local competitors. 2 0 Rules requiring the protection of

14 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 8-20; Date-Bah, supra note 13, at 8-11;
IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE
WORLD BANK GUIDELINES 1-8 (1993).
15See SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 15-19, 87.
16 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 38-50 (presenting and critiquing
the
"classical theory" of foreign investment and contrasting it with the "dependency
theory").
17 See SHIHATA at 9-12; SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 38.
18 See SHIHATA at 9-12; SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 38-41.
19 On the other hand, multinational corporations that engage in foreign direct
investment might attempt to circumvent the domestic tax system through the use
of
20 transfer pricing. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 46-47.
See Vandevelde, Economics, supra note 2, at 481-87; Robin L. Cowling, Pics,

Pops and the MAI Apocalypse: Our Environmental Future as a Function of
Investors' Rights and Chemical Management Initiatives, 21 HOUS. J. INT'L L.
231, 276-89 (1999); Jan McDonald, The MultilateralAgreement on Investment:
Heyday or Mai-Day For Ecologically Sustainable Development?, 22
MELBOURNE U. L.R. 617 (1998); Sophie Hsia, Foreign Direct Investment and
the Environment: Are Voluntary Codes of Conduct and Self-Imposed Standards
Enough?, 9 ENVTL. LAW.

673

(2003); Alejandro Posadas,

Combatting

Corruption Under InternationalLaw, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 411
(2000); Merilee S. Grindle, Public Policy, Foreign Investment and
Implementation Style in Mexico, in ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLITICAL
CONFLICT: U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 81 (Jorge I. Dominguez ed.,

1982).
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FDI may encroach on the host state's sovereignty and to restrict the
government's ability to respond to emerging social or economic crises. 21
B.

Historical Development of International Investment Law
The treaty rules governing the protection of foreign investment
originated from general international legal principles concerning states'
treatment of foreign nationals located within their territory.22 Broadly
speaking, an alien who travels within a foreign jurisdiction has always
been entitled to certain minimal protections against harm to his or her
physical person and property. 23 An injury to the alien was deemed an
injury to the home state.24 Often, the imperial powers of the 17th, 18th
and 19th centuries enforced these principles with respect to their own
nationals through military intervention. 25 Over time, as foreign direct
investment became an integral component of those powers' economies
(particularly those of Great Britain and the United States) the protection
of aliens' property rights emerged as a crucial concern.26
As the newly defined capital exporting states gradually lost
control over their colonies, they sought to replace military force with
robust legal standards as a means of protecting their nationals'
investments.27 These capital exporting states insisted that host state
governments were obliged to provide a certain minimum level of
treatment that was consistent from state to state and not dependent on the

21

See Robert Stumberg, Sovereignty by Subtraction: The Multilateral

Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 491 (1998); Mark Vallianatos,
De-Fangingthe MAI, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 713 (1998); Stuart G. Gross, Note,
Inordinate Chill: BITs, Non-NAFTA MITs, and Host-State Regulatory Freedom:
An Indonesian Case Study, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 893 (2003).
22 See, generally, C.F. AMERISINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES
TO
ALIENS (1964); Richard B. Lillich, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE
(1983). See also SORNARAJAH, supra
note 1, at 121.
23 See AMERISINGHE, supra note 22, at 2, 37.
24 SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 121 (citing Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS

Case [1939] PCIJ Series A/B N 76 at 16).
25 KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY
AND PRACTICE 7-8 (1992) [hereinafter Vandevelde, UNITED STATES
INVESTMENT
TREATIES]; SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 9-10.
26
See CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD 137-64 (1985).
27 See VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 25, at
9; SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at

10, 123; LIPSON, supra note 26, at 37-43, 54.
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host's domestic regulatory or property law regime.28 Among the most
crucial of these international standards was a rule requiring
compensation for the expropriation of an investment by the state. The
basic formula preferred by the United States for such compensation,
known as the Hull formula, required that the compensation payment be
"prompt, adequate, and effective., 29 This formula was ultimately adopted
in the Restatement (Third) on the Law of Foreign Relations,3 ° and has
remained a key aspect of United States policy on expropriation. 3
Not content to rest on the legitimacy of their asserted customary
rule, the capital exporting states entered into a series of bilateral
commercial treaties intended to reinforce whatever protection was
already provided to their investors. These treaties, often denominated
"Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" (FCN treaties),
contained clauses specifically prohibiting uncompensated confiscation of
property, as well as imposing more general protective standards such as
most favored nation treatment (discussed in Part III, infra).32 These
treaties were signed not only among the capital exporting states
themselves, but also between such states and the relatively undeveloped
and newly independent capital importing states.
The poorer capital importing states demonstrated opposition to
the putative legal standard for investment protection almost from its
inception. Some of the most vehement resistance came from the Latin
American states, which broadly adopted what became known as the
Calvo doctrine.33 According to this doctrine, states were required merely
to afford aliens (including foreign investors) treatment equivalent to that
given to their own nationals; no "objective" international standard was
28

See LIPSON, supra note 26, at 8-12.

This formula, named after former U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
apparently originated some decades before the 1938 negotiations with Mexico in
which Hull invoked it as an obligatory standard for restitution of expropriated
U.S. property. See id. at 80.
29

30

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

(1998).

§ 712

supra note 1, at 254.
See, e.g., Convention of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation, May 16,
1832, U.S.-Chile, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/
chile/chile01 .htm.
33The doctrine was named after the prominent Latin American jurist Carlos
Calvo, one of the earliest and most influential figures to challenge the very
existence of a international legal regime of investment protection. See LIPSON,
supra note 26, at 80.
31 SORNARAJAH,
32
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recognized.3 4 Moreover, aliens who felt that even this national treatment
obligation had been violated could seek redress only in the courts of the
host state.35 Some Latin American states took the step of explicitly
incorporating the Calvo doctrine into their domestic statutory or
concession agreements signed
constitutional framework, as well as into
36
investors.
foreign
certain
directly with
Developing states in other regions were similarly critical of the
new investment protection standards, and particularly of the obligation to
pay compensation for expropriation of foreign-owned property. For
example, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the spread of Soviet
influence within Eastern Europe and elsewhere inspired challenges to the
underlying concepts of private property and capital investment on which
investment protection principles are themselves based. 37 Additionally, a
wave of nationalizations, centered in the oil-producing states of the
Middle East, brought host states into direct conflict with capital
exporting states and the large multinational corporations based within
them.38 Although many of these capital importing states took a less
intransigent stance than the Latin American states, conceding that
expropriation did trigger some legal responsibility, they tended to reject
the Hull formula.39 Instead, they advocated a standard of merely
"adequate" compensation.4 ° Eventually, the collective efforts of this
broader challenge to strict investment protection law culminated in a
series of declarations and resolutions in the United Nations General
Assembly, emphasizing the principles of national sovereignty, control of
the state over its own natural resources, and freedom to regulate
to expropriate) without incurring excessive
(including the power
41
monetary liabilities.
34 SORNARAJAH, supra note
35 LIPSON, supra note 26, at

1, at 89, n.25.
18, 74.

36

Id. at 80.
37 Id. at 66-70, 83-84. Beginning in 1921, the Soviets did recognize a legal
obligation to pay foreign claims, but also maintained an standing right to
confiscate private property and managed to pit the capital exporting states of the
west against one another in negotiating ever more lax terms of restitution. Id. at
66-68.
38 SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 12.
39
Id. at 402.
40

Id.

These official actions commenced in 1952 with the resolution on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, which declared the state's basic rights to
nationalize and to freely exploit its national resources. A 1962 resolution of the
4
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C.

Modern Investment Treaties and Dispute Settlement
In the latter decades of the 20'h century, the capital exporting
states began to emphasize BITs as more focused and potentially less
controversial means of protecting their nationals' investments. By
incorporating clauses prohibiting specific types of objectionable hoststate conduct, states hoped that these treaties would provide more
predictability to investors than did the vague, contested "universal"
standards.4 '
The treaties' basic function was simply "investment
protection. 4 3 From the capital importing states' standpoint, the treaties
helped to create a more attractive and (at least superficially) stable
investment climate, thus increasing inbound FDI with its attendant
economic benefits. 44 This has been termed the treaties' "investment
promotion" function.4 5 At the same time, the use of bilateral treaties
same name adopted the "appropriate compensation" term rather than the Hull
formula, while a 1972 resolution moved even further towards the Latin
American view of domestic legal control over expropriation disputes and
national treatment as the only requisite standard. Finally, in 1974 the General
Assembly passed the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A.
Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No.31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974), which passed by a vote of 120-6 with ten abstentions. The Charter not
only endorsed host states' rights to freely regulate foreign investment, but also
listed a set of standards to which capital exporting states and their investors were
Vutatively obligated to conform. See LIPSON, supra note 26, at 87-89.
Several standard substantive BIT provisions are discussed in Part III, infra.
43 Professor Vandevelde prefers the terms "investment security" and
"stabilization." See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and
Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 Colum.
J. Transnat'l L. 501, 506-10, 522-25 (1998) [hereinafter Vandevelde, Investment
Liberalization]; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral
Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 621, 631-32 (1998) [hereinafter
Vandevelde, PoliticalEconomy].
44 Vandevelde, Economics, supra note 2, at 488-91.

Id. Professor Vandevelde notes that BITs typically do not contain provisions
that cover initial establishment of investment. Host states thus remain free to
ban inward foreign investment entirely or selectively, or else to negotiate
individual terms of entry that negate some of the investment protections
afforded by the treaties. According to Vandevelde, this gap prevents BITs from
thoroughly liberalizing developing states' investment policies and enables
excessive and counter-productive political intervention in those states'
45

economies. See Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization, supra note 43, at 513-
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enabled the capital importing states that entered into them to maintain
their stated opposition to a more generally applicable international legal
standard.46
The spread of BITs has intensified dramatically over the past two
decades. Whereas some 309 such treaties had been concluded by.the end
of 1988, 47 by the end of 2001 the countries of the world had concluded
2099.48 The United States has signed 45 BITs, 20 of which were
concluded within the past 10 years. The majority of BITs worldwide,
however, are between European and developing countries. 49 Germany
alone is party to some 132 investment treaties.5 ° At the same time, the
bilateral treaties' basic content and structure is beginning to be
incorporated into multilateral agreements involving more than two
parties. This phenomenon has primarily taken place at the regional level,
most famously in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
51 of which Chapter
11 closely parallels the basic United States2
Similar investment provisions are included in a
negotiated BIT.
multilateral treaty among the ASEAN members5 3 and are among the key
elements of the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas 54 (FTAA) and
the recently negotiated Central American Free Trade Agreement
note 1, at 14.
See Athena J. Pappas, References on Bilateral Investment Treaties, 4 ICSID
REV. FOREIGN INVEST. L. J. 189, 194-203 (1989).
48 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV. (UNCTAD), WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT
2002: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS at 8,
U.N. Sales No. E.02.II.D.4 (2002).
46 SORNARAJAH,supra

47

49

U.N.

CONF.

INVESTMENT

ON

TRADE

TREATIES

AND DEV.,

CONCLUDED,

TOTAL NUMBER OF BILATERAL
2003, available at
1 JAN.

http://unctad.org/sections/ditepcbb/docs/bitsgermanyen.pdf

(last modified,

4, 2002).
Nov.
50
51

id.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.

296 (1993) & 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
52 See,

e.g. Id.

ASEAN Investment Protection Agreement,Agreement Among the
Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, and the Kingdom of
Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, entered into force
Dec. 14-15, 1987, art. X(2), reprintedin 27 I.L.M. 596 (1988).
54 See Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA): Draft Agreement,
November
53

21, 2003, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ftaadraftse.asp (last visited

Feb. 19, 2005).
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(CAFTA)55 . With the notable exception of the European Energy Charter
Treaty,5 6 which provides BIT-like protection for investments in the
energy sector, attempts to expand investment protection agreements even
further to a more global level have thus far proven largely unsuccessful most notably in the case of the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development's failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI).57 Such efforts, however, remain part of the World Trade
Organization's stated agenda.58
One of the most important components of modem investment
protection law in general and of BITs in particular is a somewhat novel
mechanism created to remove investment-related disputes from the
political realm and "legalize" the process of their resolution via
arbitration. Historically, since international legal personality was limited
to sovereigns, and any harm to an investor was considered harm to the
home state, 9 investment disputes were conducted on a state to state
level. 60 Dispute resolution was achieved through diplomatic means,
often involving the negotiation of a lump sum payment to the home state,
who might then make the funds available to the injured investor.6 1 If
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), Aug. 5, 2004, available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/DR-CAFTA/DRCAFTA Final Texts/SectionIndex.html (last visited Feb. 30, 2005).
56 Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360 (1995).
57 See Stephen J. Canner, Exceptions and Conditions. The Multilateral
Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 657 (1998); Riyaz Dattu, A
55

Journey from Havana to Paris: The Fifty-Year Quest for the Elusive
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 275 (20002001); Sol Picciotto, Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The
Antinomies of the Draft MultilateralAgreement on Investment, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 731 (1998); Stumberg, supra note 21.
58

See Eric M. Burt, Note and Comment: Developing Countries and the

Frameworkfor Negotiations on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade
Organization, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1015 (1997); Kevin C. Kennedy,

Symposium: Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium: Foreign Direct
Investment and Competition Policy at the World Trade Organization, 33 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 585 (2000-2001).
59 See AMERISINGHE at 56-61.
60 COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 8, at 217-222; Legum, supra note 4, at

535.

See MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 526-27 (3rd ed. 1991);
RICHARD B. LILLICH, BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS:
61

THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS (1999).
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legal proceedings were instituted, either before the International Court of
Justice 62 or through an ad hoc arbitration,6 3 it was the home state that
instituted the claim, conducted the litigation and appeared before the
presiding tribunal. 64
The modem investor-state dispute resolution system takes a
dramatically different approach. Virtually every BIT contains a section
allowing investors who feel their treaty-based rights have been violated
to institute arbitration against the host state.65 Such arbitrations are
frequently to be administered by the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an institution within the
World Bank Group formed in 1966 to conduct and promote investorstate dispute resolution. States that are parties to the International
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (the ICSID
Convention) 66 are bound to comply with any award issued against them
by an ICSID arbitral tribunal, and to enforce such awards made against
other host states. 67 Even states that are not parties to the ICSID
Convention include provisions within their BITs that refer disputes to
ICSID-administered arbitration, although the legal basis for enforcement
of awards in such cases is less clear.68 So far, ICSID has administered 89
disputes.6 9 Another 72 cases are currently pending.7 °

See VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 25, at
161-62; COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 8, at 221-22.
63 See Legum, supra note 4, at 534-35 (citing John Bassett Moore, HISTORY AND
62

DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES

HAS BEEN A PARTY (Washington Gov't Printing Office, 1898)).
64 See id.
65 See Vandevelde, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 42, at 632; UNITED NATIONS
CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORP'S, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 88

(1988).
66

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and

Nationals of Other States, August 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 575 U.N.T.S. 159.

See id., art. 54.
If either the host state or home state in a given investment dispute is not a
party to the ICSID Convention, the arbitration will be governed by the ICSID
Additional Facility procedural rules, rather than the standard Arbitration Rules.
See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, ICSID website, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
69 International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
List of Concluded Cases,at www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases (last visited Feb. 20,
2005)..
67
68
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Binding investor-state arbitration tends to augment both the
negative and positive features of investment protection and promotion.
For example, the most crucial (and obvious) effect of the dispute
resolution clause is to give investors a direct role in defending their
interests and ensuring that violations of their rights are remedied. This
ensures that home states will not sacrifice the investors' claim for the
sake of cooperative relations between the host and home states or for
concessions on unrelated matters. Binding investor-state arbitration also
tends to augment both the negative and positive features of investment
promotion and protection. By giving investors a voice in their own fate,
the dispute resolution scheme further mitigates the anticipated risks of
FDI and thus, once again, increases investment flows. 71 At the same
time, the home state's loss of regulatory freedom (or "sovereignty", in
the view of the investment treaties' critics) is made more acutely evident
with every award rendered against a host state. Although ICSID
tribunals have no power to issue injunctive decrees or other equitable
relief compelling state compliance, the monetary value of many of the
claims filed by investors so far has been of such magnitude as effectively
to force poorer host states to reduce their regulations.72 Indeed, even the
United States has felt the potential weight of the investor-state arbitration
procedure; the size of several claims filed by Canadian investors under
NAFTA Chapter 11 is likely responsible for much of that treaty's
notoriety.73

International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
List of Pending Cases, at www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2005).
70

71 See COMEAUX & KINSELLA,

supra note 8, at 217-22.

See Gross, supra note 21, at 899 (noting that "regulatory chill" is an issue
where "just the threat of such liability will lead countries to forego needed
environmental and social legislation that might negatively affect the value of
foreign investment, rather than risk potential liability....").
73 See Dana Krueger, The Combat Zone: Mondev International,Ltd. v. United
States and the Backlash Against NAFTA Chapter 11, 21 B.U. Int'l L.J. 399. The
investors in Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States and Methanex Corp. v. United
States, both discussed infra, claimed some $725 million and $972 million,
respectively. Statement of Claim (Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States), ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (October 30, 1998), at 67, available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com; Statement of Claim (Methanex Corp. v. United
States), ICSID (W. Bank) (Dec. 3, 1999), at 13, available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com.
72
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Basic Models of Investment Protection

The substantive rules of the modem international investment law
system create two basic models of investment protection: negative
obligations and positive obligations. The negative obligation model has
been the more historically visible, it having been frequently discussed
and repeatedly invoked by investors. In contrast, the positive obligation
model, which is the primary subject of this article, has an equally long
lineage but has enjoyed a somewhat lower profile over the years. This
Part will discuss both models and identify the various substantive BIT
provisions that characterize each model in turn. The first subpart deals
with negative obligations, of which the most recognizable examples are
those provisions prohibiting expropriation, limits on currency
conversion, and "performance requirements." The subpart on positive
obligations will first note the historical basis for the imposition of
positive obligations in general international law and then will turn to
currently recognized positive obligations in international investment law.
Particular attention will be paid to the "full protection and security"
clause that is common to many BITs and most clearly illustrates the
positive obligation model.
A.

The Negative Obligation Model
The classical role of international investment law has been that
of restricting host states from taking certain actions likely to cause harm
to foreign investors or to their ability to compete within the local market.
This model is traditionally associated with the principle of investment
protection,74 and it encompasses the bulk of the obligations imposed by a
standard BIT. Under this model, the government's primary duty is
negative: a duty not to act.
1.

Expropriation and Compensation
There are several common negative obligation provisions that
appear in most BIT agreements. For example, states commonly include
a negative obligation in their BITs that prohibits
host states'

74 Investment protection can be distinguished from investment promotion, which

involves the incentivization of initial entry into a host state. See Kenneth J.
Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs, 11
INT'LTAX &Bus. LAW. 159, 162 (1993).
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This
expropriation and "measures tantamount to expropriation. 75
common 'expropriation and compensation provision' restricts the host
government's ability to directly harm investors by confiscating their
assets, by transferring those assets to a third party, or by imposing upon
investors regulatory requirements so burdensome as to deprive them of
all or a substantial part of the value of the investment.76 For instance,
suppose Poland nationalizes all private chemical-production operations
within its territory, including equipment and manufacturing facilities
owned by a private U.S. firm, this would be considered an expropriation
under the terms of the BIT in place between the United States and
Poland.77 Regardless whether it lets the equipment lie idle, takes over
operation of the facilities itself, or turns the assets over to a third party,
States BIT, Poland will still have
under the terms of the Poland-United
78
expropriation.
committed
A trickier case would be presented if the Polish environmental
ministry passed a regulation prohibiting a given piece of real estate - on
which a U.S. company had already built a factory - from being used to
process the type of substances which the U.S. firm produces. This action
would fall under the somewhat more amorphous and contentious
category of "measures tantamount to expropriation" (sometimes referred
to as "regulatory expropriation" or "creeping expropriation"). An even
more difficult case would involve the passage of a statute requiring that
all chemicals firms be at least 25% owned by nationals of Poland, which
could force the U.S. firm to sell a number of its (or its Polish
subsidiaries') shares at a substantial discount and to give up valuable
management control. Arguably, this would also constitute a "measure
tantamount to expropriation" under the BIT.79 If the Polish government
75 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1110; Treaty Concerning Business and

Economic Relations, March 21, 1990, U.S.-Poland, S. TREATY Doc No. 18 10 1st
Cong. 2d Sess. art. 7 (1990) [hereinafter U.S.-Poland Treaty].
76 VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES,

supra note 25, at 117-

125.
77 See U.S.-Poland Treaty, Art. 7; SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 277-321.
78

Id.
79 ALLAHYAR MOURI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AS
REFLECTED IN THE WORK OF THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 66, 88 (1994).

See Eastman Kodak Company, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Partial
Award No. 329-227/12384-3, p. 6 1 (1987), reprintedin 17 Iran-U.S. CTR 181
(1987) (concurring and dissenting opinion of Judge Brower)(indicating that
"expropriation can occur not only when the state itself has acquired the benefit
of the foreign investor's property, but also if the state has acquired nothing of
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took either action, the BIT may require it to provide to80the investor the
familiar "prompt, adequate and effective compensation."
In each of these hypothetical scenarios, it is clear that the harm
experienced by the investor (loss of productive assets, diminished
revenue and profits, fall in share price) would be derived primarily from
the conduct of the state, which has actively utilized its sovereign power
to place the investor in a worse position than it had enjoyedbefore the
state's action. Although other private actors may be the beneficiaries of
such state action, their role is largely secondary and passive."' The
obligation created by the treaty's anti-expropriation provision acts as a
negative right because it prevents or restricts the exercise of that
sovereign power. In this sense, such provisions resemble the broader
field of international human rights law, since both focus on protecting the
individual from the state.82 Moreover, it also accords with the WTO's
standard mode of operation, which involves the gradual whittling away
of member states' freedom to restrict private economic activity."
2.

No Restrictions on Currency Conversions
Another frequently cited example of negative obligation is the
typical BIT provision prohibiting restrictions on currency conversions.
In the past, host states concerned about maintaining the strength of both
their foreign exchange reserves and their local currencies often imposed
limitations or outright prohibitions on the sale of local currency in

value, but "at least has been the instrument of its redistribution"); S.D. Myers,
Inc. v. Canada, ICSID (W. Bank) Final Award, (Nov. 13, 2000), para.280,
reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 1408 (2001), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com
(stating that "the term 'expropriation' carries with it the connotation of a
'taking' by a governmental-type authority of a person's 'property' with a view
to transferring ownership of that property to another person, usually the
authority that exercised its dejure or defacto power to do the 'taking."').
'oSee, e.g., U.S.-Poland Treaty, supra note 78, art. 7.
8! Of course, such private actors may well have a great deal of influence over the
state's behavior, particularly in host states in which corruption is widespread and
transparent democracy is not well developed. Even in such cases, however, the
basic model holds - the parties inflicting the harm have chosen to act through
the machinery of the state, rather than in their individual capacities.
82 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 130-3 1.
83 See generally, http://www.okstate.edu/ind-engr/step/WEBFILES/Papers/
GlobalHarm body.htm (last visited May 14, 2005).

U. MIAM! INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

VOL. 13:403

exchange for hard currency.14 As a result, investors were restricted in
their ability to enjoy the benefits of their risks and efforts within their
home states, or indeed anywhere other than within the host state itself. 85
To eliminate such restrictions and thus enable sufficient incentive for
investment promotion, states adopted a standard treaty provision that
prevents the government from intervening to stop such currency
transfers.86 Again, the threatened harm to investors from restrictions on
currency conversions comes from the exercise of sovereign power to
limit the actions of private investors in a manner that reduces the
profitability and attractiveness of the investment below the level that
would be attained without such state action. The applicable BIT
provision acts to restrict the exercise of such power.
3.

No Performance Requirements
BITs also frequently contain negative obligations that bar the
host government from imposing upon investors certain "performance
requirements." For example, the government may not require investors
to use locally produced materials, to hire local labor in the production
process, or to export a certain percentage of goods produced.87 Host
states sometimes adopt such performance requirements as a means of
improving domestic sales figures, increasing employment levels, or
improving the state's current account position.88 Again, the exercise of
sovereign power in performance requirements may hurt foreign investors
by increasing the cost or decreasing the quality of the inputs they must
use (particularly as local producers and workers are likely to charge more
for their goods and services in a compulsory regulatory environment), or
by preventing the use of the investor's manufactured products for
profitable non-export purposes. The relevant BIT obligations again play
a restrictive or negative function vis-A-vis the state.
4.

National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Treatment
Finally, another common set of BIT provisions that impose
negative obligations are those requiring national treatment and most
favored nation treatment. Each of these provisions requires that the host
84

See

VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES,

139-144.
85 See id.
86
id.
87 See, e.g., U.S.-Poland Treaty, supra note 78, art. 2.
88 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 109, 113.

supra note 25, at
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state treat foreign investors from the other treaty party no less favorably
than it treats some other class of investors. 89 In the case of national
treatment, the "other classes" include similarly situated nationals of the
host state, while under most favored nation treatment, the comparison is
with similarly situated investors who are nationals of a third state. 90
Returning to the previous hypothetical, if Poland gives a special tax
exemption to domestic chemical companies, but not to U.S. chemical
companies doing business in Poland, a firm from the U.S. group can
claim a violation of the United States-Poland BIT's national treatment
clause. 9'
If Poland extends the exemption to German chemical
companies doing business in Poland, the U.S. firm can claim that Poland
has violated the most favored nation clause.92 In either case, it could be
argued that the state is exercising its sovereign power so as to leave the
U.S. firm at a competitive disadvantage, and thus the relevant treaty
terms constraining such conduct constitute negative obligations.
B.

The Positive Obligation Model
Although most common BIT provisions reflect the predominant
model of negative obligation, several less frequently invoked terms
suggest an alternative role for BITs and for international investment law
more generally. In this positive-obligation model, governments are
required not to abstain from exercising their sovereign power, but rather
affirmatively to exercise such power. In other words, the obligation is
not to refrain from acting, but to act. The threat or hardship in this
context comes from a source other than the government, and the latter is
under a duty to act to defend the investor from that threat or hardship.
The positive obligation paradigm is hardly novel within the
sphere of general international law. Authorities on state responsibility
have long recognized the principle of international legal liability for
omissions as well as actions. 93 Article 3 of the International Law
See VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 25, at
71-76.
90 See id.
91See U.S.-Poland Treaty, supra note 78, art. 2(1).
92 See id.
93See AMERISINGHE, supra note 22, at 38 ("Both positive acts and omissions by
individuals are covered by the international law notion of an act. This point is
89

too obvious to require developing."); WILLIAM E. HALL, A

TREATISE ON

INTERNATIONAL LAW 64-65 (A. Pearce Higgins ed., 8th ed. 2001) (1924) ("A
state must not only itself obey the law, but it must take reasonable care that
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Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility define an
internationally wrongful act of a state as including "conduct consisting of
an action or omission [that] is attributable to the state under international
law. 94 In the oft-cited Corfu Channel case,95 Albania was held
responsible for failing to prevent damage to foreign ships and loss of
human life that resulted from mines laid in its territorial waters with its
constructive or actual knowledge.96 The concept of positive obligations
in general international law is evident today as well. For example,
Article 2 of the International Law Commission's 2001 Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, defines an
internationally wrongful act of a state "when conduct consisting of an
action or omission is attributable to the state under international law; and
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. 9 7
One of the primary criticisms of legal rules imposing positive
obligations is the potentially greater impact such rules have on
sovereignty (or the perception of sovereignty) as compared with rules
imposing mere negative obligations. Whereas the latter merely draw
boundaries around the foreign national that the state may not cross, the
former effectively tell the state how to do its job. Taken far enough,
positive obligations could compel the construction of entirely new state
institutions or the dramatic expansion of existing ones, so as to meet all
the protective requirements imposed and to address the proliferation of
threats from malevolent private actors and other forces. This could in
turn have significant, if not grievous, fiscal implications. Interestingly,

illegal acts are not done within its dominions... [h]ence it becomes necessary to
provide by municipal law, to a reasonable extent, against the commission by
private persons of acts which are injurious to the rights of other states, and to use
reasonable vigour in the administration of the law so provided.") See also
SHAW, supra note 62, at 482-83.
94 See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, art. 2, in Report of the InternationalLaw Commision on the work of its

Fifty-third Session, International Law Commission (ILC), 53 rd Sess., Supp.
available
at
(2001),
Doc.
A/56/10
No.10,
U,N.
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State-responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm
(emphasis added).
95 Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 9).
96 See also Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims Case (U.K. v. Spain), 2 R.I.A.A.
643 (1924) (arbitrator Max Huber emphasizes the equivalence of responsibility
for inaction with responsibility for action).
97 Supra, note 95.
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similar concerns have arisen in the context of U.S. constitutional law, in
particular with regard to the doctrine of standing.98
1.

National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Treatment
As to specific examples of current positive obligations in the
investment law context, national treatment and most favored nation
treatment can be read to create a positive obligation in some situations.
For example, if a host government provided postal service to all domestic
businesses, but refused to extend such service to foreign investors, such
discriminatory treatment would arguably violate the national treatment
obligation under any applicable BIT. Such a violation would be
particularly evident if there were no private courier services available in
the host state as an alternative, due either to market conditions or to
prohibition by the government. In order to provide national treatment,
the government would either have to eliminate postal service to all
domestic investors in "like circumstances" with the foreign investor, or
98 While some jurists have supported the extension - to intended or potential
beneficiaries of government regulation - of the right to sue the government to
compel such enforcement, (see Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S.
11 (1998) (Breyer, J.)) others have stressed that such expansive standing would
upend the government's traditional regulatory prerogative and impose an
enormous strain on the government's resources. See id. at 36-37 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See also Professional Pilots Federation v. F.A.A., 118 F.3d 758,
763-64 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(holding that agency decisions not to institute
rulemaking proceedings are subject to an exceptionally deferential standard of
review). Similar concerns have been raised in the context of institutional reform
litigation, in which courts are asked to (and often agree to) use their injunctive
powers to compel and oversee reforms to such public facilities as schools and
prisons. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional
Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994 (1999); Malcolm M.
Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998); Lon L.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). A
recent example of this phenomenon and resultant debate can be seen in
Campaignfor FiscalEquity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003), in which
the New York Court of Appeals ordered the state to calculate and provide the
funds necessary to provide New York public school students with a "sound basic
education". Such a duty falls clearly within the definition of "positive
obligation", and raises a number of questions concerning the court's legitimacy
and
the
state's
capacity
to
perform
as
directed.
1oo See discussion, supra that the same provisions can be viewed as imposing a
negative obligation.
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else to provide it to the foreign investor. Although the government in
theory has a choice, a widespread denial of services would clearly be the
less viable option, and thus national treatment creates a de facto positive
obligation. This example defies to some extent the distinction between
negative and positive obligations drawn earlier because the harm does
not derive from a private, non-state actor. However, the state is
compelled to offer a particular service or benefit rather than merely to
stay out of the investor's way, thus associating the applicable legal rules
more closely with the positive obligation model.
2.

Denial of Justice
A more straightforward illustration of a positive obligation is
found in the "denial of justice" doctrine long recognized as customary
international law,99 and therefore (as discussed infra) incorporated into
many modem BITs. This doctrine guarantees to foreign parties "[flair
courts, readily open to aliens, administering justice honestly, impartially,
without bias or political control."' 00 Under the doctrine, a host
government is required to address, through criminal or civil legal
proceedings, a wrong done to a foreign party, or else to afford that party
an adequate opportunity to initiate legal proceedings to vindicate its own
rights.'0 ' While it is unclear just how far the government must go in
pursuing the alleged wrongdoers, and just what sort of procedures must
be available to the foreign party, the doctrine imposes two unmistakably
affirmative duties on the host government: the duty to establish certain
legal institutions and the duty to utilize those institutions in certain
circumstances. 02
99 See HALL, supra note 94, at 59; Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, International
Law in the Past Third of a Century, Recuiel de Cours de l'Academic de la Have
(General Course in Public International Law, The Hague, 1978) at 59-61.
'00Edwin Borchard, The "Minimum Standard" of the Treatment of Aliens, 38
MICH. L. REv. 445, 460 (1940); see also Robert Azinian, et al. v. Mexico, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (1999) Award at paras. 102-3 (Nov. 1,
1999), reprinted in 391 I.L.M. 556, available at.http://www.naftaclaims.com.
(noting that denial of justice can arise when a state's domestic courts 1) refuse to
entertain a suit; 2) subject a suit to undue delay; 3) administer justice in a
"seriously inadequate way"; or 4) "clearly and maliciously" misinterpret the
law).
1o1
See C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 50-51, 98-99 (1967).
102 See HALL, supra note 94, at 59; Robert Azinian, et al. v. Mexico, ICSID (W.

Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, Award at paras. 102-3 (Nov. 1, 1999),
reprinted in 391 I.L.M. 556, available at.http://www.naftaclaims.com.

To be
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For example, suppose the U.S. chemical company in the above
example employs a Polish national as a local manager. The company,
upon learning that the manager has embezzled substantial company
funds and engaged in fraudulent transactions intended to transfer
company resources to firms owned by the manager's relatives, seeks to
bring a civil claim for restitution and breach of fiduciary duty, and
requests that the Polish government bring criminal charges against the
manager. If the Polish government and Polish courts refuse to grant any
such procedural redress, or demonstrate so much bias against the
company in the conduct of the proceedings that the potential for remedy
is effectively nullified, the U.S. company may be able to claim a denial
of justice. As explained at greater length in Part IV, this may in turn give
rise to a violation of the BIT in force between the two countries. The
relevant legal obligations here are positive because they require the
Polish state to awaken and exercise its power to address harm inflicted
upon the U.S. investor by a private individual unaffiliated with the state.
Some of the more recent investment treaties have begun to
include provisions specifically requiring host states to provide "effective
means" or "effective facilities" for the enforcement of investors' rights,
including access to court and administrative proceedings and the right to
appoint qualified counsel in such proceedings. 0 3 Such provisions would
appear to codify explicitly the "denial of justice" principle, and thus
create an additional textual source of positive obligation. No claims
based on such provisions have yet been decided.

sure, the doctrine also imposes a negative obligation to refrain from undertaking
or facilitating "manifestly unjust" legal proceedings against a foreign party. See
L. Sohn and R. Baxter, Convention on the International Responsibility of States

for Injuries to Aliens, Art. 8, at 96 (1961) (providing for violation of
international law through unreasonable, discriminatory, or otherwise improper
judgments by tribunals against aliens); E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC
PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 340 (1916) (noting that a "grossly unfair or
notoriously unjust decision" may violate international law).
103 See Agreement for the Encouragement and Protection of
Investments, Art.
3(3),
May
21,
2001,
Jordan-Kuwait,
available
at
http://www.agreements.jedco.gov.jo/main/doc/KuwaitipciOle.html];
Treaty
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.El
Salvador,
Art
2(4),
March
10,
1999,
available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/bits/usasal-e.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
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3.

Full Protection and Security
The clearest example of a positive obligation under international
investment law is the "full protection and security" requirement
contained in many BITs.) 4 Similarly-worded provisions were included
in BIT predecessors such as the Jay Treaty' ° and the various FCN
treaties, °6 which more commonly referred to "the most constant
protection and security"; 0 7 the phrases are generally considered
indistinguishable in practice. 08 In the model United States BIT, the
clause imposing this obligation suggests that it is rooted in a more
general standard of investment protection under traditional international
law: "Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable
treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security, and shall in no case be
accorded treatment less than that required by international law."' 0 9 As
discussed infra, there has been some debate over whether this language
creates a duty equivalent to the customary international standard or
whether it imposes some special, heightened requirement.'0

104 See, e.g., Netherlands Revised Model Agreement on Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, art. 3, in BILATERAL INVESTMENT

TREATIES 117 (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations 1988).

'0'
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,
art. 14, 8 Stat. 116.
106See,

e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July 27, 1853,

U.S.-Arg., art. 2, 10 Stat. 1005, T.S. No. 4.
107 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Dec. 23,
1925, U.S.-Estonia, art. 1, 44 Stat. 2379, T.S. No. 736; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Rights, Feb. 22, 1926, U.S.-El Salvador, Art. 1, 46
Stat. 2817, T.S. No. 827. Other FCN treaties referred to "special protection" or
to "full and perfect protection." See VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 25, at 15.

108 VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 25, at 77.

Investment treaties involving other countries often include similarly-worded
clauses. See, e.g., Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Art. 2(2), March 30, 2000, Jordan-Sudan, available at
http.//Www. agreements.jedco.gov.jo/main/doc/SudaniOOe.html.
109 Draft Model Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investment, art. 3, reprinted in VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES
INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 25, Appendix A-4, 28 (giving an example of
the boilerplate model BIT that the United States favors).
11o
Compare S.D. Myers v. Canada, ICSID (W. Bank) Partial Award, (Nov. 13,
2000), at paras. 262-64, with Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICDSID (W. Bank)
ARB(AF)/91/1, Award, (Aug. 30, 2000) at para. 74, with Pope & Talbot v.
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Although the latter issue remains unresolved, tribunals
considering alleged violations of full protection and security have tended
to interpret the phrase as requiring the host state to adhere to a single
standard of "due diligence" in actively protecting foreign investors from
harm. This standard is to be distinguished from the "strict" or "absolute"
liability interpretation suggested by some investors.
In Asian
AgriculturalProducts, Ltd. v. Sri Lanka,"' a shrimp farm located in Sri
Lanka and owned by a British investor was destroyed by Sri Lankan
security forces after they had received reports that the facility was being
used by local rebels." 2 The investor argued before the ISCID Tribunal
that these events constituted a violation of Article 2(2) of the applicable
Sri Lanka-United Kingdom BIT, 1 3 which obligated the host state to
provide "full protection and security."'' 14 Rejecting the investor's
argument that Article 2(2) created a "strict liability" standard,"' the
tribunal discussed at length the more appropriate "due diligence" test
stating that: "'[d]ue diligence' is nothing more nor less than the
reasonable measures of prevention which a well-administered
government could be expected to exercise under similar
circumstances.""' 6 The Tribunal found that this standard had been
violated by the government's failure to simply instruct the farm
management to exclude certain suspect individuals from the farm's staff,
which would have minimized the need to exercise force in "securing" the
facilities." 7 "[S]uch measures," the Tribunal explained, "fall within the
normal exercise of governmental inherent powers... ' '118
The
International Court of Justice applied a similar due diligence standard to
a positive obligation in Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.P.A.
Canada, ICSID (W. Bank) Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (April 10, 2001) at
paras. 110-18, availableat http://www.naftaclaims.com.
1 Asian Agriculatural Products, Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award (June 21, 1990), reprintedin 30 I.L.M. 577 (1991).
112 Id. at 580.
113 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern-Ireland and the Government of Sri Lanka for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments of February 13, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 886 (1980).
114
Id., art. 2.
115
Asian Agricultural Products, supra note 113, at 599-602.
116 Id. at 612 (citing Alwyn V. Freeman, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES
FOR
UNLAWFUL ACTS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES 15 (1957). See also SHAW, supra
note 62, at 492 (noting the applicability of the "due diligence" test).
117 Asian Agricultural Products, supra note 113,
at 616.
118id.
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(ELSI)." 9 The ELSI Court held that Italy's government had not violated
the "constant protection and security" requirement contained in a United
States-Italy FCN treaty when it failed to prevent workers from
temporarily overtaking a factory owned by the investor. 120 Indeed, as the
Court pointed out, the Italian authorities were able to ensure to some
extent that the
factory continued to operate, thereby avoiding a waste of
12 1
resources.

Although it is difficult to pin down the precise degree of
affirmative protection a state must afford in order to meet the "due
diligence" test, the Asian Agricultural tribunal suggested two basic,
alternative approaches. The first is an "objective" approach, which treats
all host states equally and requires the degree of protection that can be
"legitimately expected" from a "reasonably well organized modem
state.' 22 Under this approach, a developing state such as Indonesia
would apparently be held to the same standard as the United States in
protecting foreign investors from harm by non-state actors. The second
approach, which the tribunal indicated was becoming increasingly
disfavored, is a "subjective" approach that takes into account the
"relatively limited existing possibilities of local authorities in a given
context.' 23 In other words, this latter approach treats every case as
different, and considers, inter alia, the limited financial or operational
capacity of a particular host government to provide the needed
protection.
A second unresolved question concerns the scope of the "full
protection and security" clause: is the host government required to
protect the investor from purely economic harm? This issue was
contested in The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States,124 in which the

119
120

Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (United States v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
Id. at 54 (stating that the "provision of 'constant protection and security'

cannot be construed as the giving of a warranty that property shall never in any
circumstances be occupied or disturbed.").
121 Id. For another international tribunal decision finding an affirmative
duty to
protect foreign investors under international law, see Janes (USA) v. United
Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 82, 91 (1921) ("International law imposes on a
nation the obligation to take appropriate steps to prevent the infliction of wrongs
upon aliens").
122 Asian Agricultural Products, supra note 113,
at 612.
123 Id.

124 Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case. No.

ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003), reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 850 (2003),
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investor, a Canadian funeral services company that had lost a $500
million dollar verdict in a state court jury trial, claimed that the state of
Mississippi (for whose conduct the United States was liable) had
breached its full protection and security obligation by failing to prevent
the plaintiffs' attorney from successfully appealing to nationalist
sentiment in the jury. 25 The United States argued for the application of a
two prong test under which full protection and security required only
"reasonable police protection against acts of a criminal nature that
physically invade[] the person or property of an alien.' 26
Although the tribunal ultimately did not address this issue
directly, 127 the validity of such an explicit limitation is dubious. The first
prong of the U.S. test, requiring protection only against criminal acts,
appears somewhat arbitrary. To allow the government to stand by while
a private party accidentally starts a fire near an investor's factory, while
requiring that government to act when the fire is lit intentionally, would
serve little practical purpose. 2 ' Moreover, as there is no objective,
available at http:www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf.

Loewen

also invoked the "denial of justice" doctrine, discussed supra. Id.
125 See Joint Reply of Claimants The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L.
Loewen To the Counter-Memorial of the United States (Loewen Group, Inc. v.
U. S.), ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, at 96-97 (June 8, 2001),
availableat http://www.naftaclaims.com.
126 See Counter Memorial of the United States of America (Loewen Group,
Inc.
(Mar.
30,
2001),
ARB(AF)/98/3,
at
176
(W.
Bank)
Case
No.
v. U.S.), ICSID
availableat http://www.naftaclaims.com.
127 The tribunal did note that the duty to provide full protection and security
"must extend to the protection of foreign investors from private parties when
they act through the judicial organs of the state." Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award on Jurisdiction, at para. 58
(Jan. 5, 2001), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com. Presumably, few such
actions performed through judicial organs would qualify as either "criminal" or
"physically invasive."
18 For a discussion of the tenuous distinction between tort and crime in U.S.

domestic law, see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71

B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991). It might be argued that the deterrence benefits of
punishing intentionally harmful conduct would surpass that of punishing merely
negligent conduct, and thus that the full protection and security obligation could
be limited in at least this regard. Even if accepted, however, this argument does
not support the United States position that the clause requires no government
response to acts of a non-criminal nature. Moreover, given the overlap between
standards of liability for criminal and civil negligence in at least some domestic

430
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internationally recognized basis for distinguishing between injurious
conduct that is criminal and injurious conduct that is merely tortuous, the
determination of criminality will depend on the domestic law of the
country in question. 129 Thus, under the U.S. approach, the extent of a
host state's "full protection and security" obligation would be directly
correlated with the breadth of its criminal law; the broader the law's
coverage, the greater the protection. Arbitrariness aside, this would
create a perverse incentive for a host state to weaken its criminal laws.'3 0
The second prong of the U.S. test, focusing on "physical
invasion," seems inconsistent with the inclusion of intangible property
(e.g. copyrights) within the definition of "investment" in NAFTA
Chapter 11131 and many BITs; 3 2 such property by definition cannot be
physically invaded or harmed. 3 3 Moreover, a number of BITs include

legal systems, there would seem to be few policy benefits in distinguishing
between the two legal categories of conduct.
129 Presumably, the U.S. was not going so far as to limit full protection and
security to cases involving crimes under internationallaw, a rather rare and
controversial form of offense. See, e.g., Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, 92 AM. J.INT'L L. 251, 256-59 (1998)
(discussing the controversy surrounding the concept of international criminal
liability).
130 American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire,
ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/93/1, Award (Feb. 21, 1997), reprintedin 36 I.L.M. 1531,
1548 (1997), (discussing a full protection and security provision, stated that the
host state "should not be permitted to invoke its own legislation to detract from
any such obligation.").
131 NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1138.
132
133

See, e.g., U.S.-Poland Treaty, supra note 78, art. 1.
See Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization, supra note 43, at 501, 510 n.28

(discussing that ["Full protection and security"] certainly is broad enough to
permit an interpretation that it requires protection of investment (which includes
intellectual property rights in most BITs) against injury by private parties in the
form of misappropriation."). Of course, it could be argued that investors owning
intangible property are still entitled to all of the other protections provided in the
BITs, such as national treatment and freedom from uncompensated

expropriation, thus mitigating the inconsistency created by the physical invasion
test. In the absence of explicit language to the contrary, however, one must
presume that the full panoply of BIT rights are available to all investors from
contracting Parties, including those whose property is exclusively intangible.
See United Nations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
art. 31.1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (establishing that the primary means of treaty
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separate provisions requiring the host government to take certain actions
in the case of war or civil unrest; 3 4 such provisions would appear to
subsume much of the role imputed to the full protection and security
clause under the U.S. view. In any case, the United States based its
argument on the fact that Loewen Group, Inc. had identified no previous
decision in which a tribunal had found a full protection and security
violation based on purely economic harm. 13 Nothing in the case
excerpts cited by the United States actually articulated such a limitation,
and future tribunals are presumably free to take a more expansive view.
Indeed, the tribunals in two recent ICSID cases, though rejecting claims
of violations of full protection and security arising form non-physical,
non-criminal acts, did so on the basis that the respective investors had
been contributorily 13negligent,
rather than that such claims were
6
categorically invalid.

IV.
External Sources of Law in the BIT System
One of the interesting characteristics of BITs is that their
provisions can be defined and altered by the legal obligations created in
interpretation is to be the "ordinary meaning" of the "terms of the treaty in their

context.").
134

See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of

Investment, Dec. 6, 1983, U.S.- Sen., S. TREATY Doc. NO. 15, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. art. 4 (entered into force Oct. 25, 1990).
135 See Counter Memorial of the United States of America,
Loewen, United
States Merits Brief, at 176-80, available at www.naftaclaims.com (citing Asian
Agricultural Products, supra, note 113; American Manufacturing (involving
failure to prevent looting and destruction of property); United States Diplomatic
Consular Staff in Iran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (involving failure to prevent
taking of foreign nationals as hostages); Chapman v. United Mexican States
(U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. (Mex-U.S. Gen. Claims Comm'n 1930) (involving
failure to prevent shooting and wounding of foreign national); Biens
Britanniques au Maroc Espagnol (Reclamation 53 de Malilla - Ziat, Ben Kiran)
(Spain v. G.B.), 2 R.I.A.A. 729 (1925) (involving failure to prevent mob from

destroying foreigner's store)).

136 See Genin v. Estonia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/99/2, Final Award
(June 25, 2001) , available at www.worldbank.org/icsid (last visited Feb. 24,
2005) (arbitrating a claim based on failure to prevent misrepresentations in
financial statements of private bank purchased by investor); Olguin v. Paraguay,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/98/5, Final Award (July 26, 2001), available
at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (arbitrating a
claim based on failure to supervise financial institution that ultimately became
insolvent and unable to repay investor's deposits).
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separate treaties and other sources of international or domestic law. BITs
are not unique in this regard; multilateral trade agreements such as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 137 and the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 3 ' also
39
incorporate external sources of law into their own internal schema.
However, BITs go somewhat further than the other treaty types by
combining multiple incorporating devices and by making a direct and
general reference to "international law" as a source of binding
obligations. As a result, BITs are subject to effective amendment
without the explicit assent of the contracting parties themselves. Often,
parties entering into standard BIT arrangements may not fully appreciate
the potential for such amendments.
A.

Most Favored Nation Clauses and BIT Networks
One example of a BIT provision that incorporates external law
into the BIT is the most favored nation (MFN) provision. Like trade
agreements, BITs typically include a MFN provision, which in this
context requires the host state to treat foreign investors no less favorably
than that provided to investors from a third state. 40 Essentially, MFN
provisions have a twofold effect. First, they prohibit the host state from
engaging in de facto discrimination that would result if the host states
favored particular investors by reducing regulatory burdens on only those
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (pts. 5 &
6),
T.I.A.S.
1700,
55
U.N.T.S.
188,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/gatt47_e.pdf [hereinafter GATT].
138 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), available at
www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS].
139 See, e.g., id. art. 9 (incorporating the Berne Convention); Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 27 (1994), available at www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/15sps.pdf. [hereinafter SPS Agreement] (incorporating "international standards"
developed by organizations such as the International Office of Epizootics);
GATT, supra note 139, art. 7(1)(4)(a) (incorporating currency valuation
standards established in the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund).
140 See VENDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra
note 25,
71-76.
37
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4
investors or providing those investors with favorable tax treatment.1 '
Second, MFN provisions incorporate external law by requiring the host
state to provide to investors from the other contracting state the same or
better treatment that is guaranteed by separate BITs entered into with
third parties. 142 Although there are limits, BITs incorporate external law
even where third-party BITs offer better treatment. Thus, if State A
enters into a BIT with State B omitting the prohibition of certain
performance requirements, but then State A enters into a BIT with State
C containing such a prohibition, the prohibition is thereby incorporated
into the BIT with State B.
The scope of a typical BIT's MFN provision appears wide
enough to incorporate all of the positive obligations from third-party
BITs described earlier. For instance, in Emilio Augustin Maffezini v.
Spain, 4 3 an ICSID Tribunal considered whether a clause in an
Argentina-Spain BIT extending MFN treatment to "all matters covered
in this Agreement" required the host state (Spain) to extend to an
Argentinian investor the right to initiate investor-state arbitration, as
contained in a separate Chile-Spain BIT. 44 Observing that such dispute
resolution was "inextricably related to the protection of foreign
investors," the Tribunal concluded that any similar dispute resolution
provisions contained in separate BITs between either Argentina or Spain
and a third country could be incorporated into the Argentina-Spain
BIT.145 On these facts, it is likely that the Tribunal's application of the
MFN provision in Maffezini to an arbitration provision would also apply
to other third-party BIT provisions such as the full protection and
security clauses, which are substantive rather than procedural, and thus
"inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors" like the
46
provision in question in Maffezine. 1

141 See

id.
See id. at 34.
143Emilio Augustin Maffezini v. Spain, ISCID (W. Bank) Case No. Arb/97/7,
Award on Jurisdiction, (Jan. 25, 2000) availableat http://www.naftaclaims.com.
144 Id. at 14-25.
141 Id. at 21.
146 See id. (discussing that MFN considerations only apply to other third-party
BITs that relate to the same subject matter as the basic treaty).
[I]f a third-party treaty contains provisions for the settlement of
disputes that are more favorable to the protection of the
investor's rights and interests than those in the basic treaty, such
provisions may be extended to the beneficiary of the most
142
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For that reason, perhaps the standard MFN statement that
treatment of parties to BITS should be no less favorable than that
"provided" to other states should be interpreted as meaning the treatment
should be no less favorable than that "actually provided" to other states.
Under this interpretation, the MFN provision would refer only to the
prohibition of de facto discrimination, and would not require that
external third-party BIT provisions be incorporated into the BIT. On the
other hand, this interpretation of MFN provisions fails to take into
account the importance of de jure guarantees in helping investors plan
their initial entry into the market. To return to the previous hypothetical,
if no State C investors have yet entered the host state, State B investors
under the de facto approach will have no way of knowing whether
performance requirements will be lawfully imposed, whereas State C
investors will be confident that they will face no such requirements upon
entry. The State C investors will thus have a competitive advantage in
terms of ex ante investment strategy.
B.

Minimum Treatment Clauses and Incorporation of
"International Law"
Under either interpretation of the MFN clause described above,
the host state remains capable of exercising control over the content of its
BIT obligations, simply by refusing to enter into additional BITs with
standards stricter than those already entered into. However, there is
another standard BIT provision that potentially removes the host state's
control over incorporation of external law into the BIT. The minimum
treatment provision, sometimes included in a larger section on "treatment
of investment,"'' 47 generally tracks the language in the model U.S. BIT,
quoted supra at Part 111(c). As is evident in that example, this is the
point at which the language of "full protection and security," also
discussed supra, is often inserted. The incorporation of "international
law," without further definition, invites tribunals applying such a
provision to search beyond the four corners of the treaty for the source
and content of the minimum standard itself. Depending on the outcome
of that search and the ongoing development of international law, the
tribunals could impose obligations on the treaty parties that may deviate
in scope and character from those originally envisioned by the drafters.
favored nation clause as they are fully compatible with the
ejusdem generis principle.
Id.

141
See,

e.g. , U.S.-Poland Treaty, supra note 78, art. 2(6).
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Incorporation of external treaties?
A debate, alluded to earlier, has arisen in at least one context as
to whether the standard minimum treatment clause language incorporates
all sources of international law, including treaties and "general
principles, ' 148 or merely customary international law. In Methanex Corp.
v. United States, 149 a NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute, a Canadian investor
(Methanex) challenged California's ban of the gasoline additive MTBE.
Methanex argued that NAFTA Article 1105 - that treaty's version of the
minimum treatment clause 5 ° - required treatment in accordance with,
among other sources, the WTO's Agreements on Technical Barriers to
Trade ("TBT") 151 and on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS
Agreement").15 2 As part of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the
original members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiated
and entered into both of these treaties in 1994.153 Methanex asserted that
the MTBE ban fell within the scope of the TBT agreement, though not
the SPS agreement. 54 However, Methanex further contended that
California was obligated to comply with several basic principles of both
agreements, such as the TBT's requirement of a "legitimate regulatory
objective" and the SPS's requirement of the "least trade restrictive"
measure available. 55 Thus, in Methanex's view, the minimum treatment
1.

See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34, cl. 1, June 26, 1945;
59 Stat. 1055, T.I.A.S. No. 993 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].
148

149Amended Statement of Claim (Methanex Corp. v. U.S.), ICSID (W. Bank)

(Feb. 12, 2001) available at http://www.naftaclaims.com.
150
NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1105. Article 1105(1) states that Article 1105(1)
states that "[elach Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security." Id.
151Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 27 (1994), available at
www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/17-tbt.pdf.
152 See SPS Agreement, supra note 141; Amended Statement of Claim
(Methanex v. U.S.), ICSID (W. Bank), at 58-65 (Feb. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com.
153
See WTO Agreement, Annex IA,supra note 141.
154See Amended Statement of Claim (Methanex Corp. v. U.S.), ICSID (W.
Bank), at 58-65 (Feb. 12, 2001), availableat http://www.naftaclaims.com.
155See id. Other principles invoked included the TBT's prohibition on
"unnecessary obstacles" to trade, id. at 59, and the SPS's requirement that
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clause in Article 1105 incorporated not only the obligations contained in
an external multilateral treaty applicable by its own terms, but also the
principles contained in a similar treaty not directly applicable in the
instant case. It is not clear whether Methanex would have limited this
incorporation effect to only those treaties to which all three NAFTA
states were parties, or to major multilateral treaties such as those
administered by the WTO, or even to trade and investment agreements
generally. Presumably, there would be no need for states to incorporate
the obligations of other BITs to which the NAFTA parties were
members, since this would be accomplished through the MFN clause in
Article 1103.156

Nevertheless, the U.S. position - that Article 1105 incorporated
only customary international law rather than external treaties - has
ultimately prevailed in other NAFTA disputes due to the adoption by the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission, 5 7 on July 31, 2001, of an official
interpretation of Article 1105 endorsing the same view. 158 This
interpretation, however, is only binding on tribunals adjudicating
NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes, 59 and leaves open the possibility that
tribunals interpreting other BITs will adopt the broader interpretation
urged by Methanex. Indeed, the tribunal in UPS, while recognizing the
Free Trade Commission interpretation as binding upon it, noted of
Article 1105 that:
The reference is to the basic protection conferred on
foreign interests by the general body of international
law, at least. We say "at least" since the unrestricted
reference to "international law" in article 1105 would

government actions be based on "sufficient scientific evidence" and not
"disguised restrictions" on trade. Id. at 61-62.
constitute
56
1 See

VANDEVELDE,

supra note 25, at 34.

157 See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain
Chapter 11 Provisions, July 31, 2001, Part B, reprinted in 13 WORLD TRADE &
ARBITRATION MATERIALS 139 (Dec. 2001).
158 See, e.g., Loewen Group, Inc. v. United Statess, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.

ARB(AF)/98/3, Final Award, at 36 (June 26, 2003), reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 811

(2003),, availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf.
159 See NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1131(2).
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suggest, as UPS says, that treaty obligations may 60also
contribute to the protection afforded by that article.
Thus, under at least one view of the minimum treatment clause,
the obligations contained in treaties other than the BIT itself could
become part of the BIT and apply directly to each of the parties when
acting as host states. The importance of this phenomenon becomes
particularly striking if such external treaties are taken to include treaties
entered into subsequent to the adoption of the BIT; the importance
becomes even more striking if taken to include treaties to which one of
the BIT parties has not itself acceded. For example, if TRIPS is
considered to be incorporated into a BIT between States A and B, then
even if State A is not a party to TRIPS itself it could be required to
provide investors from State B with various measures of copyright and
patent protection. 6 Thus, a series of specific positive obligations would
be imported into the BIT and enforced by investors through the specified
arbitration procedure. Additionally, if TRIPS were amended to require
even more stringent intellectual property protection, the BIT standard
could arguably be augmented as well.
Incorporation of customary law-as formed by treaties
Accordingly, if the Free Trade Commission's interpretation that
BIT minimum treatment clauses held to incorporate only customary
international law is adopted broadly, the analysis becomes somewhat
more complicated. It is more difficult for states to define a precise
standard of conduct, particularly a standard involving positive obligation
of the state to act, through customary international law than through a
convention. 62 Traditionally, in order to identify a rule of customary
international law, states had to point to established state practice and
demonstrate that such practice reflects states' opinio juris-the
2.

UPS v, Canada, ICSID (W. Bank), Award on Jurisdiction, at 26 (Nov. 22,
2002) available at www.naftaclaims.com. In UPS, the investor argued that the
protections afforded by a separate BIT were incorporated into Article 1105.
161 See TRIPS, supra note 140, art. 9. Under Article 9, as under various other
TRIPS provisions, State A would, in fact, be required to comply with the
obligations of yet further treaties, such as the Berne Convention. Other aspects
of TRIPS will be discussed in Part V, infra.
162 See WILLIAM E. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 11-12 (8th ed. 2001).
160
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recognition that the practice is driven by a sense of legal obligation. 63
Relevant state practice can include statements of government officials or
acts and omissions of state agents or organs.164 The opinio juris
requirement, meanwhile, does not mean that all states must explicitly (or
even tacitly) consent to a rule for it to become binding international
custom. A crucial difference between custom and treaty is that the
former can eventually become binding on a state even without its
consent, once
the applicable rule is sufficiently definite and
65
widespread.
As indicated in Part II, the historical practice of states thus far
has left substantial gaps in the customary international law of investment
protection.
Indeed, it is this indeterminacy that necessitated the
development and adoption of BITs and similar treaties in the first place.
Such treaties, however, have the potential to serve not only as
alternatives to customary rules, but as sources of such rules. There has
been some debate over the possibility that treaties can form customary
international law. 166 Commentators have pointed to a fundamental
difference between the two types of sources of international law: while
treaties involve a degree of reciprocity or quid pro quo, customary law
reflects a recognition of the "common will" and that a given principle is
binding on all (including the recognizing party) as a preexisting

S.S. Lotus, (Fr. v. Turk.), 1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 9 , at 25 et seq. (Sept. 7);
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.) 1969 ICJ 3, 41 (Feb. 20); MARK E.
163

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 47-52 (1997)
[hereinafter VILLIGER]; SHAW, supra note 62, at 71-76. ICJ Statute Art. 38
requires that customary international law, in order to be binding, must be
"accepted as law." I.C.J. Statute, art. 38(1) June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.I.A.S. No. 993.
'64 See VILLIGER, supra note 165, at 16-26.
165 North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 38-39, 41. This issue has
VILLIGER,

engendered substantial debate among scholars, see, e.g., IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA,
The Treaty as a Law-Declaring and Custom Making Instrument, 22 REVUE
EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 51 (1966) (arguing that custom binds

even unwilling states); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 311
(Robert W. Tucker ed., 2nd ed. 1952) (arguing that custom manifests state
consent).
166 See Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the
Formation of Customary InternationalLaw, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 327
(1994); VILLIGER, supra note 165, at 173-75.
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normative matter.167 In fact, one expert has suggested that the opinio
juris required for customary law is formed only by the recognition of an
obligation derived
from custom, rather than a convention's contractually168
duty.
derived
Moreover, states may enter into treaties for reasons other than a
sense of normative obligation, such as immediate economic self-interest
or a desire to gain concessions in unrelated areas. For example, a
developing state with limited foreign exchange reserves and a
historically restrictive monetary policy might agree to an investment
treaty term prohibiting currency controls not because it believes that such
a prohibition is or should be a general rule, but rather because its
developed counterpart has promised to provide loans or other measures
to support the developing state's currency. Treaties may at times be used
to abrogateor object to prior customary law. 69 Thus, a state's accession
to a treaty may be simply a matter of convenience or denial, rather than
evidence of opiniojuris.
Finally, one could argue that opinio juris requires distinct
awareness of a putatively binding legal rule. If a state accedes to a
particularly long, complex and technical treaty, it is unlikely that it
intends thereby to acknowledge that each provision contained in the
treaty is a generally binding legal norm.1 70 Customary international law
involves recognition of and compliance with rules or principles, rather
than written instruments themselves. It is perhaps for this reason that
even observers less hostile to the notion of custom derived from treaty
acknowledge that the notion of "automatic" or ipso facto generation of
customary
law through treaty accession would take the process a step too
1
far.

17

The predominant view has ultimately been that customary
international law can result from the formation of treaties and other
international agreements. 72 The primary argument in favor of such a
process centers on the relative clarity and determinacy of treaties. While
167

See

SHAW,

supra note 62, at 81; Kishoiyian, supra note 168, at 333-38;

RESTATEMENT §
168 See VILLIGER,

102, cmt. (f).

supra note 165, at 27.

See id.
See id.
171 See SHAW, supra note 62, at 82.
169
170

172

See id. at 81-82;

VILLIGER,

supra note 165, at 173; IAN BROWNLIE,

PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
RESTATEMENT § 102, cmt. (0.

LAW

12-13

(5 t'

Ed.1998);
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it is often extraordinarily difficult to identify and document the state
practice and opinio juris needed to form a customary rule, treaties can
potentially provide clear evidence of both."' This view is espoused in
the widely cited North Sea ContinentalShelf opinion, in which the I.C.J.
noted that "there is no doubt that this process is a perfectly possible one
and does from time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the
recognized methods by which new rules of customary international law
may be formed," while cautioning that "[a]t the same time, this result is
not lightly to be regarded as having been attained. 174 Article 38 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 175 states, somewhat less
forcefully, that "nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a
State as a customary rule of
treaty from becoming binding upon a '1third
76
international law, recognized as such."
There are several ways a treaty could lead to the formation or
recognition of customary international law. First, a treaty can codify a
preexisting customary rule, thereby rendering it easier to identify and
enforce (though not actually contributing to its legally binding
character).177 Alternatively, a treaty can generate a customary rule by
catalyzing the requisite state practice and opinio juris. The resultant
customary rule would be binding even on those countries not parties to
the treaty itself.178 Finally, a treaty can crystallize a rule that had
previously been a mere trend or general practice, by providing the
missing element of opinio juris.179 Regardless of which method is
responsible for creating customary law out of a treaty, only a single rule
is being treated
at a time, rather than the entire content of a convention,
80
compliance.1
and
recognition
through
law
as customary
See VILLIGER, supra note 165, at 173-75. As noted earlier, one might
question whether a treaty can ever reflect the necessary sort of opinio juris.
However, the same sort of criticisms-particularly the possibility that the state's
action was taken for a self-interested motive other than a sense of legal
obligation-could be leveled against most of the sorts of acts offered as
171

evidence of a customary rule.
174 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb. 20).
75

May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
North Sea ContinentalShelf (F.R.G. v. Den.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb. 20).
177 See VILLIGER, supra note 165, at 117-46.
178 See id. at 167-91; BROWNLIE, supra note 174, at 12.
179 See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1968 I.C.J. at 39.
180 The Vienna Convention itself would appear to be an exception to this
principle; it is often considered binding customary law in its entirety. See Jack
'

176
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North Sea Continental Shelf lays out several tests that a treaty
must meet before it can contribute to the formation of customary
international law. First, a treaty-based rule must be so widely accepted
that its eventual universal application can be justified; a single, sui
generis bilateral treaty can hardly be invoked to establish a norm binding
the entire international community. 1 ' It is unclear exactly how many
states would be needed to satisfy such a "numerosity" requirement (if it
can be so characterized), but it is generally accepted that absolute
universality is not required. 182 Second, even if the number of parties to a
treaty is overwhelming, the treaty might not form a customary rule unless
the parties include representatives of all (or at least most) concerned
factions of states.'83 The composition of such factions varies with the
subject matter of the treaty. In the context of international investment
law, a multilateral convention that did not include a sufficient contingent
of both developed and developing (or, perhaps, capital-importing and
capital-exporting) countries would be of dubious value in establishing a
customary rule. Thus, the OECD's ill-fated attempt to negotiate a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, even if it had been successful,
would clearly have had no binding effect on the developing states whose
conduct has been the primary concern of international investment law, as84
there was not adequate representation of theses developing countries.
Similarly, though more debatably, a multilateral investment convention
that did not include parties from a particular geographic region (e.g.
Latin America) or from a particular legal tradition (e.g. Islamic law)
might be a poor candidate for transformation into customary
international law.' 85
L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, InternationalAgreements. A Rational Choice
Approach, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 113, 129 (2003-2004).

North Sea Continental Shelf, 1968 I.C.J. at 42. See also VILLIGER, supra note
165 at 177-187.
182 Neither the North Sea Continental Shelf opinion nor the various
commentators on the issue have suggested any formula for determining the
minimum number of participants needed to enable a multilateral treaty to
generate customary international law.
183 North Sea Continental Shelf, 1968 I.C.J., at 42.
184 See, e.g., Rainer Geiger, Regulatory Expropriations in InternationalLaw:
181

Lessons from the MultilateralAgreement on Investment, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.

94 (2002).
185 An additional time-period or "longevity" factor-granting customary
international law status only when a treaty has been in force for a certain length
of time-has garnered some support but is not considered applicable in all
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Although the prior two requirements appear to be related to the
traditional state practice element of customary international law, the
North Sea Continental Shelf opinion referred to a third test more
reflective of the opiniojurisrequirement. A treaty-based rule must be of
a "fundamentally norm-creating character" in order to create a customary
rule. 8 6 The theoretical basis of this requirement is the distinction
between those treaties that operate essentially as contracts under private
law between sovereigns and those that are intended to establish a regime
governing the broader community of nations under a public law
function. 187 Unlike private contract agreements among states, public
lawmaking agreements that realize the identical aims of many parties are
the result of the "common will," and are meant to create recognition of
common "norms" of future conduct. 88 Villiger has interpreted this
norm-creating character requirement as entailing two sub-factors. First,
a rule must be "general," i.e. intended to apply to an indefinite and
potentially unlimited number of states, rather than to particular, specified
subjects (as is usually true of bilateral agreements). 89 Second, a rule
must be "abstract," in the sense that it is prospective and applicable to an
indefinite number of future cases, rather than retrospective and intended
19
to resolve a particular dispute or matter. 0
Thus, international economic agreements could potentially lead
to the development of a customary international rule that states could be
incorporated into standard BITs through the minimum treatment clause.
A series of BITs could codify or generate customary rules governing
particular issues.
For example, if prohibition of local content
requirements became a universal element of all BITs over a period of
time, and if enough BITs were adopted by a sufficiently diverse set of
countries, such a prohibition might be viewed as a rule of customary
situations. See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1968 I.C.J. at 42-43; VILLIGER,
supra note 157, at 184-85. This would be particularly true when, for example,
the rule concerned a new or emergent technology as to which all or most states
had agreed to a common governing rule but which has not existed for the
otherwise necessary time period.
186 North Sea Continental Shelf, 1968 I.C.J., at 42.
187 See Kishoiyan, supra note 168 at 333-35.
188 Id.
189 See VILLIGER, supra note 165, at 177-78. This factor was identified explicitly
in North Sea Continental Shelf, 1968 I.C.J., at 41-42. The term "erga omnes"
could be used as an alternative to "general."
190 See VILLIGER, supra note 165, at 179.
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international law, rather than merely a common treaty provision. Even
subsequent BITs lacking such a provision might be viewed as adopting
the same prohibition by requiring treatment in accordance with
customary international law. It is true that were such a customary rule to
exist, states would be legally bound by it regardless of whether they had
entered into any BITs at all, let alone BITs involving minimum treatment
clauses. However, if investors wanted to enforce their rights through
compulsory arbitration, the customary rule would have had to be
incorporated into their BIT.
Whether BITs can feasibly establish
customary international rules is clearly debatable, however, because
many developing states refuse to accept many of the developed world's
preferred standards as generally binding; this is what compels the current
"BIT-by-BIT" approach in the first place.' 9' The UPS tribunal noted that
"the many bilateral treaties for the protection of investment...vary in
their substantive obligations; while they are large in number their
coverage is limited; and...in terms of opiniojuris there is no indication
that they reflect a general sense of obligation."' 192 On the other hand, the
tribunal in Mondev v. United States' 93 reached an opposite conclusion,
observing that:
Investment treaties run between North and South, and East
and West, and between states in these spheres inter se. On
a remarkably widespread basis, States have repeatedly
obliged themselves to accord foreign investment such
treatment.
In the Tribunal's view, such a body of
concordant practice will necessarily have influenced the
content of rules governing the treatment
of foreign
94
investment in current international law.'
If the Mondev view is widely adopted, states that conclude BITs
completely unrelated to a given dispute could thus collectively shape the
content of the minimum treatment provision.
191 See Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT. The Growth of BilateralInvestment
Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24
INT'L LAW. 655 (1990); see also, generally, Kishoiyian, supra note 168.
192 UPS v. Canada, ICSID (W. Bank), Award on Jurisdiction, at 31-32 (Nov. 22,

2002), available at www.naftaclaims.com.
193Mondev v. United State, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 Final
Award, at 58 (Oct. 21, 2002), availableat www.naftaclaims.com.
194
Id. Final Award at 40-41.
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Other international agreements, particularly multilateral
agreements such as those negotiated in the WTO, may be even more
likely to create binding customary rules. Typically, well over a hundred
countries from every region enter into WTO agreements, including many
dozens of developing countries. Those states that are not yet members of
the WTO and its various agreements almost invariably strive to join, a
tendency that concededly reflects economic self-interest rather than a
sense of legal duty. Nonetheless, these countries' interest in joining at
least indicates a willingness to treat the established trade rules as
universally binding. 95 The universality requirement thus would be
addressed in a more coordinated manner for multilateral agreements than
BITs, and a form of opinio juris could derive from the organization's
prominence and legitimacy.
Several tribunal decisions appear implicitly to support the
treatment of multilateral economic agreements as a source of customary
international law. The UPS tribunal, in rejecting the notion of a
customary international law requiring controls on anticompetitive
behavior, expressly noted that the WTO members had not yet reached
consensus on a set of rules mandating such controls. 196 Although it is
unclear whether the tribunal would have treated the completion of a
WTO-sponsored Agreement on Competition Law as dispositive, one
must assume from the Tribunal's reference to the matter that such a
treaty would have merited at least close consideration. Considering
another claimant's interpretation of the minimum treatment provision,
the tribunal in ADF Group, Inc. v. United States197 also noted, albeit in a
footnote, the efforts to develop a multilateral investment agreement
within the framework of the WTO's Doha Round.' 98 In S.D. Myers v.
Canada,199 a third NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunal explicitly relied on the
language of the WTO agreements and on WTO dispute resolution
panels' interpretation of that language in determining the meaning of
'95 Welcome to the Club: Cambodia and the WTO, THE ECONOMIST, Sep. 13,
2003; Knock Knock, World Trade, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1996.
196 UPS v. Canada, ICSID (W. Bank), Award on Jurisdiction, at 29-30 (Nov. 22,
2002), availableat http://www.naftaclaims.com.
197 ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/1, Final Award, at 89 n.174 (Jan. 9, 2003), available at
www.naftaclaims.com.
' 98 Id. at 89, n. 174.
199 S.D. Myers v. Canada, ICSID (W. Bank), (Nov. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com.
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"like circumstances" for the purposes of Article 1102's national
treatment clause.200 The Tribunal also used the WTO language in
considering whether a single state action could simultaneously be
governed by both Chapter 3 and Chapter 11 of NAFTA.20 ' Although it
could be argued that reference to WTO panel decisions is merely an
interpretive device, and not the recognition of a customary rule, the value
of such a device derives from the WTO agreements' broad membership
and authoritative status in international trade law.
3.

Incorporation of customary law created by international
organizations
In addition to facilitating the conclusion of multilateral treaties,
public and private international organizations may be able to generate
customary international law through programs aimed at "harmonizing"
various states' domestic laws. This process can be distinguished from
the treaty-formation process in that it does not aim to produce an
instrument to which sovereign states can be reciprocally bound, and may
not even involve the direct participation of state representatives at all.20 2
Instead, the groups involved in harmonization efforts collectively seek to
distill various states' jurists and scholars' pronouncements regarding
particular legal subjects into a single, coherent set of model rules. Often,
these efforts take on a prescriptive character, with participants including
new or amended rules within the model set in an attempt to clarify and
improve on established precedent.0 3 Organizations may offer the codes
ultimately drafted as bases for future multilateral treaty negotiations, as
guides for states seeking to reform their own domestic laws, or as
interpretive tools for international or domestic tribunals.

200
201

Id. Final Award, at 60-61, 72-73.
Id.

For a more expansive review of the role and characteristics of harmonizing
"codes" and U.N. resolutions vis-i-vis treaties or "conventions," see VILLIGER,
202

supra note 165, at 119-148; BARRY E.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (3rd ed. 1999).

CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE,

See Statute of the International Law Commission, Art. 15, G.A. Res. 174(11),
U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947) [hereinafter ILC Statute]. The function of proposing
new international law is often referred to as "progressive development" of the
law, and distinguished from the "codification" process. See Statute of the
International Law Commission, Art. 15, G.A. Res. 174(11), U.N. Doc. A/519
(1947) [hereinafter ILC Statute].
203
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Many of the most influential harmonization programs have taken
place under the auspices of the United Nations and affiliated institutions.
The International Law Commission (ILC), established by the U.N.
General Assembly in 1947,206 is a body composed of persons of
"recognized competence in international law" 20 who act in their
individual capacity rather than as representatives of states,2 °6 and has
been active in efforts to harmonize the rules governing, inter alia, state
responsibility, state succession, and international criminal law.20 7
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) has played a key role in the development of common
principles of economic and commercial law. These principles are often
applied as supplementary "gap-filling" rules in transnational contract
disputes governed by international conventions such as the Convention
on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 20 8 or by choice-of-law clauses
referring generally to "international law."20 9 UNCITRAL has also done
extensive work in the areas of international arbitration procedure and
transnational insolvency. 2 '0 Like the ILC, UNCITRAL was formed by
the U.N. General Assembly as a standing body within the U.N.
framework, with a similar mandate of codification and progressive
development of law, though in a narrower range of subjects. Other
specialized U.N. committees, operating on an ad hoc basis, have led
harmonization programs on such matters as terrorism and human
cloning, often with the express goal of producing a draft convention.21

204 VILLIGER,

supra note 165, at 75.

205

ILC Statute art. 2, para. 1.

206

See VILLIGER, supra note 165, at 75.
See id. at 77; International Law Commission website, available at

207

http://www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm.

Final Act of the U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Official Records, Annex I at 230 (Apr. 10, 1980), U.N. Doc. A/ Conf.9
7/18 reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980).
208

See Joel P. Trachtman, The InternationalEconomic Law Revolution, 17 U.
PENN. J. INT'L EC. L. 33 (1996) ("[T]he lex mercatoria may be viewed as a body
of customary international law applied by states and arbitral tribunals to
relations among private persons...").
210 See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
(1985); UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997), available
at http://untreaty.un.org/ola-intemet/cod.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
211 U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Codification Division web site, available
at
209

www.un.org/law/lindex/htm.
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Other public and private organizations, though of somewhat
more limited prominence and influence, have played a similar role in the
harmonization of international law. The Inter-American Juridical
Committee of the Organization of American States, whose function is
analogous to that of the ILC, tends to maintain a more regional focus
than its U.N. counterpart, 212 as does the European Committee on Legal
Cooperation, founded by the Council of Europe. 213 As in the U.N.
system, specialized bodies such as the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) undertake more specific harmonization programs.
Predating all of these organizations, and indeed the ILC itself, are two
private organizations founded and largely comprised by prominent
international lawyers of both scholarly and professional castes: The
Institut de Droit International and the International Law Association.2 14
Harmonization programs instituted by such organizations can
result and have resulted in the formation of customary international law.
The capacity of any given program to generate such binding rules
depends to some extent on the breadth or participation in the program
and in the sponsoring organization.
Widespread membership or
involvement may be viewed as state practice sufficient to meet the
numerosity and representation requirements of North Sea Continental
Shelf.2 15 Should the participants at a harmonization program reach a
consensus as to a rule or set of rules, the requisite opiniojurismay also
be inferred, although this point might be more dubious given the
explicitly non-binding nature of draft texts. It is more likely that such
agreed texts will attain customary international law status over a period
of time, as states slowly and unilaterally move into voluntary
compliance. This process can be seen at work in the case of the Vienna
Convention, a product of the ILC-U.N. system that the United States
212 Jo M. Pasqualucci, 38 STAN. J. INT'L

L. 241, 257 (2002) (citing Basic
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V/I.4 rev. 8, 2 (May 22, 2001), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/document.htm).
213 VILLIGER, supra note 165, at 73-74; European Committee on Legal
Cooperation web site, available at www.coe.int/T/E/LegalAffairs/Legal-cooperation/SteeringCommittees/CDCJ/General
214 See Restatement, § 103, reporters' note 1. The Restatement's drafters clearly
viewed these organizations as capable of issuing quasi-authoritative statements
on the content of international law.
215 See generally North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.) 1969 I.C.J.
3, 41
(Feb. 20).
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government and its courts have long accepted as a codification of
customary international law.216 In any case, such developments are
substantially more plausible when the harmonization program in question
is one initiated by a public international organization; it would require a
markedly greater leap of faith to infer broad state recognition of a draft
proposed by a set of private "authorities," regardless of their degree of
prominence.
Norms created though harmozination programs in the investment
law context could contribute significantly to the development of positive
obligations under the minimum treatment provision and the full
protection and security doctrine. A standard domestic regulatory model
could be identified, against which a host state's own programs could be
measured. This seems most likely to result from the work of one of the
organizations specializing in the harmonization of economic law, such as
UNCITRAL and WIPO.
Alternatively, if a harmonization program was ultimately
successful in shaping the domestic laws of a substantial number of states,
the uniform rules could be accepted as "general principles of law" within
the meaning of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.217 Similarly, the rules could
be viewed as "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists"; this
would provide the private harmonizing organizations a more direct route
to influence rulemaking, but the rule ultimately formed would be of only
subsidiary legal effect under Article 38. Again, an interpretation of the
minimum treatment provision that allowed for incorporation of only
customary international law would make these points purely academic
from an investor's standpoint. However, if the broader interpretation
preferred by the investor in Methanex, discussed supra, were adopted,
such general principles and even scholarly pronouncements could
become directly applicable to the host state as part of the larger body of
international law.
V.

Regulatory Harmonization and External Sources of Positive
Obligations in BITs
The previous Part attempted to demonstrate the potential for
developments in international law external to a given BIT to alter the
content of that BIT, and more specifically, to give rise to privately
enforceable positive obligations. This Part will examine certain recent
See, e.g., Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 (2d Cir.
2000); Sec'y of State Rep., 65 Dep't State Bull. 684, 685 (Oct. 18, 1971).
217 I.C.J. Statute, supra note 151.
216
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developments in the WTO and in multilateral treaties likely to generate
such external obligations and thereby to bolster the viability of claims
analogous to those rejected in UPS. These obligations, once identified
and established, could be incorporated into a BIT by arbitral tribunals
under any of the theories discussed in Part IV(B) -- and, consequently,
into all other BITs in a "network," as discussed in Part IV(A).
A.

Early harmonization measures in the GATT / WTO system
Well before the advent of the WTO, the GATT system had
played a direct role in shaping the internal laws of member states. For
example, the GATT 1967 Antidumping Code,218 the Tokyo Round
220
Antidumping Code, 219 the Uruguay Round's Antidumping Agreement, 22
and certain provisions of the Uruguay Round's Subsidies Agreement '
were entered into to stop GATT members from abusing antidumping and
countervailing duty proceedings in order to impose otherwise-prohibited
tariffs.
These treaties each contain detailed rules governing the
substance and procedure of domestic antidumping and countervailing
duty law, including such basic elements as the calculation of applicable
tariffs and access to judicial review. Similarly, the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Rules of Origin 222 addressed the distortion of trade flows
through conflicting customs laws by requiring member states to adopt a
standardized set of such laws.
The Agreement on Government
Procurement, which was first concluded in the Tokyo Round in 1979223
218

Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade, June 30, 1967, Anti-dumping Code, 651 U.N.T.S. 320,
GATT B.I.S.D. (15' h Supp.) at 24 (1968).

Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
h
Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, Anti-dumping Code, GATT B.I.S.D. (26
Supp.) at 171 (1980).
219

220

Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade 1994, reprinted in THE RESULTS

OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF

168 (1995).
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, reprinted in THE

MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS - THE LEGAL TEXTS
221

RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
THE LEGAL TEXTS 264, 278 (1995).
222 Agreement on Rules of Origin, reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:

THE LEGAL TEXTS

241

(1995).
223

See Agreement on Government Procurement,THE GENERAL

AGREEMENT ON

TARRIFS AND TRADE, THE TEXTS OF THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS at 27

(1986).
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and then expanded in the Uruguay Round, 2 4 provides a third example.
These treaties were intended to prevent protectionism in government
purchases of goods and services, and in doing so, require member states
to adopt specified procedures for soliciting and evaluating contractors'
bids.
All three sets of agreements in a sense impose positive
obligations on the member states by requiring them to take certain
actions with respect to foreign goods or actors; merely leaving the
concerned private parties alone would be insufficient. In the case of
antidumping or government procurement, the state must provide foreign
actors with specific procedural protections against unfair competition
from rivals. If privately enforceable, such positive obligations could
prove a genuine burden to states inexperienced in the administration of
such elaborate procedural schemes and lacking the resources to develop
the necessary institutions.
However, the obligations imposed by these treaties have
negative elements as well, since the harms the treaties are respectively
aimed at preventing derive in part from the conduct of the state itself. It
is the state that enables the antidumping proceeding, imposes the tariff,
awards the contract, or classifies the good; a state could always avoid
treaty violations by eliminating its antidumping laws altogether, by
actively favoring foreign contractors, or by dropping the import
regulations and restrictions that give customs rules practical effect.
While none of these options seem politically feasible, their theoretical
availability highlights the fact that the aforementioned treaties require the
government both to actively protect private actors and to refrain from
harming those actors.
Intellectual property
Intellectual property protection provides an important example
of a more purely positive obligation that could be imposed through the
WTO system and other multilateral harmonization programs.
Intellectual property law almost by definition tends to involve the use of
the state's sovereign power to protect owners of property from harm
caused by private actors (through those actors' costless capitalization on
B.

224

Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,

Annex 4B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, vol. 31 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/

gpr-94_e.pdf (last visited March 16, 2005).
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the owner's investment of time, money, and thought into the production
of the protected asset). 225 This basic role of a state in international
intellectual property law, under the above definition, is an entirely
"positive" role. On the other hand, one employing a more Hohfeldian
line of analysis may suggest that in acting to protect certain exclusive
"rights" over a given property item, the state is simultaneously denying
associated rights to others within the state's territory, and thus playing a
more "negative" role. Indeed, intellectual property law typically does
not convey the right to use a given item of intellectual property, but
rather the "negative" right to prevent others from using such item.226
This complementary negative role, of course, is true of any action taken
by the state to protect an individual from the conduct of others.
Moreover, intellectual property is explicitly included within the
definition of "investment" in many modern investment treaties, 227 further
strengthening the presumption that certain private actors can be singled
out as having a valid claim to protection. This in itself, however, does
not ensure the incorporation of specific positive obligations other than
those that may derive from the treaties' national treatment and most

Such protection, at the most basic level, consists of the implementation in the
domestic law-either through legislation or through the provision of direct
effect to international law-of substantive rules prohibiting the infringement of
private intellectual property rights. An additional element of such protection
frequently involves granting intellectual property owners access to courts for the
prosecution of infringement claims. A somewhat less common mechanism for
protection is direct action by state law enforcement officials against those who
225

infringe on others' intellectual property rights. See GRAEME B.
AL, INTERNATIONAL

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND

DINWOODIE, ET
POLICY 1067-68

(2001) [hereinafter Dinwoodie]. Each of these forms of protection involves
action by the state to guard against harm inflicted by one private actor upon
another.
226
See

FREDERICK

ABBOTT,

ET AL,

THE

INTERNATIONAL

INTELLECTUAL

22 (1999). As an illustration of this "negative" quality of the
intellectual property right itself, the mere acquisition of a U.S. patent right to a
particular drug does not ensure the right to produce and market the drug within
PROPERTY SYSTEM

the United States. Such affirmative use rights are granted only upon application
to the Food and Drug Administration, which typically bases its approval upon
the provision of substantial empirical evidence of the drug's safety and efficacy.
See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2002).
227 See, e.g., Foreign Investment Protection Agreement, Oct. 3, 1991, Can.-

Hung., 1993 Can. T.S. No. 14.
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favored nation treatment provisions.22 In order to give definitive
substantive content to the "minimum standard" and "full protection and
security" provisions as applied to intellectual property, it is important to
look at binding treaty or customary rules in sources external to the
investment treaty.
Efforts to harmonize intellectual property law have resulted in
the enactment of a wide range of multilateral treaties, the drafting of
complementary model rules and the creation of new international
institutions to assist in the implementation of certain related obligations.
For much of the 20th century, the most significant intellectual property
treaties were the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property229 and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and

Artistic Works. 230 Each of these treaties imposed upon their signatories
limited standards of protection for certain types of intellectual property:
patents, trademarks and related rights in the Paris Convention, and
copyrights in the Berne Convention. Moreover, the Paris Convention
established rudimentary procedural rules for state recognition of patents
and trademarks registered elsewhere. 3 In conjunction with these
treaties, two organizations-the Paris Union and the Berne Union-were

The treaties' common provisions on expropriation, which might act to
prohibit a state from terminating particular intellectual property rights held by
foreigners, would not seem to require affirmative enforcement of such rights. An
argument could be made that termination and failure to enforce are functionally
equivalent, and that failure to enforce thus falls within the definition of
"measures tantamount to expropriation." This, however, would require a
fundamental revision to the basic understanding of expropriation as an act of
inference by the state in private affairs. For a discussion of the treatment of
intellectual property rights under NAFTA Chapter 11, see Allen Z. Hertz,
228

Shaping the Trident: Intellectual Property Under NAFTA, Investment Protection
Agreements and at the World Trade Organization,23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261, 298-

303 (1997).
229 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 13
U.S.T. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision
Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
230 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Beme Convention].
231 See Paris Convention, supra note 231, arts. 4, 6.

Spring 2006

BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES

formed to administer the development and application of the respective
treaties.232
Another important contribution to the development of
international intellectual property law was the formation in 1967 of the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIIPO). Set up as a successor
to the Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property, WIPO was
charged with the broad mission of "promoting the protection of
intellectual property throughout the world. 233 In addition to taking over
the administrative functions of the Paris and Berne Unions (as well as
those of some 21 additional multilateral treaties), WIiPO has worked to
harmonize intellectual property laws both by providing a forum for the
drafting, revision and conclusion of new intellectual property treaties and
by facilitating the adoption of resolutions and the formation of model
domestic laws.234 WIPO currently includes 182 member states.235
In 1994, the TRIPS Agreement was enacted as part of the
package of Uruguay Round instruments created what is probably the
most robust, important, and controversial set of rules governing the
protection of intellectual property to date. 236
TRIPS, which is
enforceable via the WTO's dispute settlement process, both incorporated
several substantive provisions of the Paris and Berne Conventions (as
well as the Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of
Integrated Circuits) 237 and introduced a number of new obligations, most
of them advocated primarily by the more technologically advanced
232

DINWOODIE, supra note 227, at 44. Each union is governed by an Assembly

made of representatives of the treaty member states, and by an Executive
Committee. Id.
233

14,

Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July
1967,

art.

3(i)

(amended

on

Sept.

28

1979),

available at

http://www.ipo.int/treaties/en/convention/trtdocswo029.html (last visited Feb.
29, 2005).
234 See DINWOODIE, supra note 227 at 44; About WIPO, The World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), available at http://www.wipo.int/aboutwipo/en/overview.html [hereinafter WIPO website].
235 WIPO website, Id.
236 TRIPS, supra note 140. See DINWOODIE, supra note 227, at 45; Charles R.
McManis, IntellectualProperty and InternationalMergers and Acquisitions, 66

U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1286 (1998); Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite,

Intellectual Property, Corporate Strategy, Globalisation: TRIPS in Context, 20
WIs. INT'L L.J. 451 (2002).
237 World Intellectual Property Organization: Treaty on Intellectual Property In
Respect of Integrated Circuits, May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M 1477 (1989).
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developed countries. 23 8 TRIPS also provided for the creation of a
Council, composed of representatives from all member states, one of
whose primary purposes is to monitor the implementation of TRIPScreated mandatory norms and standards within the domestic law of each
member state. 39
Though international intellectual property law initially focused
on relative standards such as national treatment and on the procedural
prerequisites for the acquisition and recognition of intellectual property
rights,240 there has been a marked trend towards the development of
uniform substantive standards governing the scope, content and
enforcement of these rights. The treaty provisions implementing these
standards often impose positive obligations, requiring the government to
protect or to provide means of protecting the defined property rights. For
example, Article 2 of the Berne Convention both defines the term
"literary and artistic works" (listing a number of items specifically
included within this category) and provides that all such works are to
receive protection in all countries within the Berne Union.241 Article 16
provides that infringing copies of a protected work shall be liable to
seizure in any country in the Union where the work receives legal
protection.242 In addition, Article 7 establishes a minimum time period
for the duration of protection of rights under the Berne Convention.243
Several provisions of the Paris Convention similarly may require
affirmative standards and measures of protection for particular items.
Article 6bis states that the member states of the Paris Union "undertake"
to prohibit the use of trademarks that are liable to create confusion with

238

See, e.g., Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some

Implications of the Internationalizationof Intellectual Property, 24 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 109, 112 (1995) (discussing TRIPS as a means of "passive

coercion" of developing states); Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and the
Sources of (International)Copyright, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 585, 608
(2001) [hereinafter Okediji, Sources]; Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS
Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 614 (1996).

See DINWOODIE, supra note 227, at 46.
Gana, supra note 240, at 137-38.
241 See Beme Convention, supra note 232, arts. 2(1), 2(6).
242 Id. art. 16.
243 Id. art. 7.
239
240
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marks that are already "well known" within those respective states.
Some have interpreted this as creating a self-executing right and thus
giving the owner of the well-known mark a direct remedy within each
member state in which such confusion is threatened.245 Similarly, Article
1Obis requires that member states "assure" to nationals of other member
states "effective protection against unfair competition," including "any
act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters,, 246 as well as a list of several more specifically
prohibited actions, including trade libel and confusion of consumers with
respect to the nature or identification of particular goods, is provided.247
However, there has been some disagreement as to whether this Article
creates a self-executing right; U.S. courts, for example, have been
divided on the issue. 248 Moreover, Articles 9 (requiring seizure of
imports bearing unlawful trademarks) and 1Oter (requiring member states
to provide "appropriate legal remedies effectively to repress" conduct
referred to in Articles 9, 10 and lObis) involve elements of positive
obligation.
For its part, TRIPS has been both heralded and reviled as greatly
expanding the scope and content of these minimum standards of
intellectual property protection.249 Indeed, TRIPS has been described as
244

It should be noted, however, that the determination of whether a particular

mark is well-known is to be made by the domestic authorities of the country in
which protection is sought. See Paris Convention, supra note 231, art. 6bis.
245 See G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 87-88 (1968).
246 Paris Convention, supra note 219, art. lObis.
247

WIPO has developed a set of Model Provisions on Protection Against Unfair

Competition, which is intended to give more detailed content to the unfair
competition standard. See DINWOODIE, supra note 227, at 158.
248 Contrast Vanity Fair Mill, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640-41 (2d
Cir. 1956) (holding that the Paris Convention itself creates no private right of
action under U.S. law) with Davidoff Extension S.A. v. Davidoff Int'l, Inc., 612

F.Supp. 4, 8 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (noting the court's view that the Paris Convention
is self-executing and listing several benefits it provides under U.S. law,
including protection from unfair competition). See also Bodenhausen, supra

note 247, at 143 (arguing that paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Paris Convention are
unquestionably self-executing and directly applicable under the domestic law of
member states).
249 See e.g. Gana, supra note 240, at 121; Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute
Settlement and the Sources of (International)Copyright, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC.
U.S.A. 585, 608 (2001) [hereinafter Okediji Sources]; See Marci A. Hamilton,
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the only WTO agreement establishing positive standards for the conduct
of domestic policies.25 ° In addition to incorporating the provisions of
Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention and Articles 1-12 and 19 of the
Paris Convention, TRIPS identifies with far more specificity than earlier
treaties the types of items to be protected as patents, trademarks and
copyrights, as well as the rights to be accorded owners of such items.
For example, Article 15 requires that eligibility for trademark registration
extend to "[a]ny sign, or any combination of signs, capable of
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of
other undertakings," and in particular to "words including personal
names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and combinations of
'
Article 16 provides
colours as well as any combination of such signs."251
that owners of registered trademarks shall have the right to prevent
others from using the same mark on similar goods when such use is
likely to create confusion among consumers. 5 2 Articles 27 and 28,
respectively, play parallel roles within the context of patent rights. 53 As
to copyrights, in addition to re-introducing the Berne Convention's
substantive standards, Articles 10, 11 and 14 require the extension of
additional specific rights such as the right to prohibit commercial rental
of originals or copies of copyrighted works.254 Other provisions require
similar protections for items such as geographical indications, industrial
designs, designs of integrated circuits, and certain undisclosed
information.
Perhaps even more notably, Articles 41-49 impose an extensive
and detailed set of obligations concerning enforcement of the treaty's
substantive rights provisions, including "expeditious remedies" to
prevent and deter infringement (Article 41(1)), decisions in writing
(Article 41(3)), judicial review (Article 41(4)), private rights of action

The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective,29 VAND. J.

L. 613, 614 (1996). See also Ruth L. Gana, supra note 240, at 112
(1995) (discussing TRIPS as a means of "passive coercion" of developing
states).
250 See Hertz, supra note 230, at 266 (citing Frieder Rossler, Diverging
Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade Integration in 2 FAIR TRADE AND
TRANSNAT'L

HARMONIZATION

(Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec, eds., 1996).
251 TRIPS, supra note 140, art. 15.
252

TRIPS, supra note 140, art. 16.

253

TRIPS, supra note 140, arts. 27, 28.
TRIPS, supra note 140, arts. 10, 11, 14.

254
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(Article 42(1)), and the availability of both injunctive and monetary
relief (Articles 44 and 45).5 Member states are thus explicitly required

not only to amend their own domestic substantive law to prohibit certain
conduct, but also to make available judicial and administrative
mechanisms for ensuring that such substantive law is applied to
individual cases.
Although there is substantial and justifiable doubt as to whether
these treaty-based harmonization efforts have thus far generated binding
norms of customary international law,256 the requisite Continental Shelf
elements are evident that future tribunals may eventually recognize the
establishment of such norms. The requirement that for treaty law to
become international customary law it needs widespread and
representative membership present little difficulty; the Paris Convention
counts 166 states as contracting parties, while the Berne Convention has
152 and TRIPS has 146.257 Included among the contracting parties to
each treaty are both developed and developing states from every
geographic region of the world, representing every major form of
domestic legal tradition. Moreover, the treaties clearly demonstrate a
"fundamentally norm-creating character": they are intended in principle
to apply to a potentially unlimited number of parties, they are prospective
in effect and of indefinite duration, and they speak largely in terms of the
creation of universal standards.
However, the developing states' ardent resistance to the
enactment of strengthened substantive and procedural obligations in the
TRIPS negotiating process, as well as those states' subsequent
expressions of frustration and disappointment over the impact of the
established TRIPS regime on their domestic economic, cultural and
health care policies,258 indicates that the developing states viewed TRIPS
255

TRIPS, supra note 140, arts. 41-49.

256

See Thomas Cottier, The Impact of New Technologies on MultilateralTrade

Regulation and Governance, 72 CHI.-KENT L.R. 415, 418 (1996) ("A

comparison of standards and rules of protecting investment and real property
abroad and IPR [intellectual property right] protection reveals a complete
absence of the latter in the body of customary international law."); Ari Afilalo,
Constitutionalization Through the Back Door. A European Perspective on
NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT. L. & POL. 1, n.121 (2001)
("...TRIPS... is unlikely to amount to customary international law.").

See Treaties and Contracting Parties, WIPO website, supra note 236 (last
visited Feb. 29, 2005).
257

See The Right to Good Ideas: How Patents Help the Poor, The Economist
(London), June 23, 2001, at 21.
258
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as binding only in a quasi-contractual sense, and not as a codification or
crystallization of universal customary norms. Thus, the requisite form of
opinio juris would arguably be lacking. Another reason opinio juris
might be lacking is that there are significant fundamental tensions
between traditional conceptions of property in many developing state
societies and the natural rights views held in much of the West.25 9 Even

if this argument were accepted, however, the process of "generation" in
BITs (discussed in Part IV, supra) could eventually operate to cure the
opinion juris defect and establish the multilateral treaties (or at least
certain of their provisions) as evidence of emergent customary norms.
Again, this would require that the various member states refrain from
conduct that could be characterized as "persistent objection" to the
putative customary norms, and that they continue to obey the mandates
of the treaties in implementing the new universal standards in their
domestic legal systems. 260 Given a sufficient period of relative accord
and cooperation, and particularly given evidence of conformity by
remaining non-member states to the treaty-based standards, the transition
from conventional to customary law could be perfected.26'

259
260

See Gana, supra note 240, at 132-37.
See Okediji Sources, supra note 151, at 605 ("[T]he process of implementing

TRIPs principles in domestic copyright legislation of WTO Member countries
will, eventually, provide a potential source of international copyright law so
long as there is a discernible level of coherence and consistency in TRIPs
interpretation.") William E. Denham IV, No More than Lanham, No Less than
Paris?A FederalLaw of Unfair Competition, 36 TEX. INT. L.J. 795, 818 n.233
(2001) ("Article 10bis(2) would play at least a significant role in determining
customary international law, besides explicitly attempting to guide Union
members' legislation."); William Patry, Choice of Law and International
Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 419 n.177 (2000) ("Other provisions of [the]
Berne [Convention], which do not so directly clash with U.S. law, while not
directly applicable, may nevertheless provide some guidance on customary
international law."). See also Patricia I. Hansen, Note, Defining
Unreasonablenessin InternationalTrade.: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
96 YALE L.J. 1122, 1145 (1987) (discussing, prior to the completion of TRIPS, a
"growing international consensus that intellectual property is property, and as
such, entitles its owners to some form of compensation").
261For a more skeptical view of the potential for such lasting consensus, see
Okediji Sources, supra note 151, at 598 ("[T]he prospect of a "supranational"

copyright law emerging from the numerous multilateral treaties and TRIPs
dispute settlement decisions is perhaps more unlikely today than ever before.").
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Additionally, evidence of emergent customary norms may
arguably be found in the proliferation of parallel harmonization efforts at
the regional level. Although the previously noted objection regarding the
opinio juris value of treaty formation and accession could again be
raised, the recurrent use of common provisions, principles, and language
within the various instruments implies a growing consensus on at least
the form, if not the justification, for intellectual property protection. z6 z
Chapter 17 of NAFTA contains a set of intellectual property provisions
clearly derivative of the TRIPS Agreement, though permitting state-tostate enforcement through the NAFTA Article 20 dispute resolution
process rather than through the WTO system.263 The EU has gone even
further, implementing a series of harmonization directives as well as
more advanced measures such as its Database Directive, which
establishes uniform rules governing the protection of non-copyrightable
compilations of information. 26 ' A similar, though less well-developed
program focusing specifically on patent protection has recently been
established among a number of the states comprising the former Soviet
Union.265 This program, codified in the Eurasian Patent Convention,
incorporates a number of the international standards previously
established by the Paris Convention and TRIPS; for example, the
standard for patentability focusing on novelty, inventive step, and
industrial applicability, as well as a patent term of 20 years.266 In Africa,
two regional organizations-the African Intellectual Property
Organization (OAPI) and the African Regional Industrial Property
Organization (ARIPO) have been formed to encourage the harmonization
of domestic intellectual property law within the continent.267 Among
other goals, ARIPO aims to provide for a single, centralized regional
Id. at 598 ("The increased density of normative harmonization witnessed in
TRIPs and European Union (EU) Directives, as well as recent WTO decisions in
TRIPs disputes, undoubtedly hint at a progressive development of international
copyright norms leading to a uniform international copyright law.").
263 NAFTA, supra note 6, ch. 17.
264 Council Directive 96/9 on the Legal Protection of Databases, art. 7, Mar. 11,
1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, 25-26 (1996).
262

265

See John Richards, Recent Patent Law Developments in Asia, 7 FORDHAM

& ENT. L.J. 599, 605-609 (1997).
See id. Identical standards can be found in, respectively, TRIPS Articles
27(1) and 33. TRIPS, supra note 140, arts. 27, 33.
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
266
267

See Tshimanga Kongolo, The African Intellectual Property Organizations:

The Necessity of Adopting One Uniform System for All Africa, 3 J. WORLD INT.
PROP. 265 (2000).
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patent application process, while OAPI (via Annex 1 to its formative
treaty) adopts the familiar TRIPS-modeled patentability standards and
provides for the conferral of exclusive and "negative" rights similar to
those enumerated in TRIPS Article 28. In Latin America, harmonization
has proceeded along similar, though less conclusive and less
substantively extensive, lines via such developments as the Central
American Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the
Andean Pact countries' Decision No. 344, and the ongoing negotiations
over the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas.268 In addition, a
wide array of recently-negotiated bilateral trade agreements include
provisions on intellectual property protection somewhat reflective of the
TRIPS scheme.269

C.

Potential future areas of harmonization
Although situated further out on the horizon of international
economic law, a number of other traditionally domestic regulatory fields
could be viewed as eventual candidates for harmonization through
multilateral agreements and eventually through customary international
law. Many of these harmonized schemes, moreover, may include
positive obligations at their core. For example, competition law concerns
the prevention of certain types of conduct by private economic actors; a
conventional or customary rule creating harmonized standards in this
area would impose upon states an obligation to intervene in the market to
combat such activity and protect both consumers and competitors. The
concept of an international standard for competition law, though
unsuccessfully invoked in UPS, has drawn a great deal of attention from
scholars and trade negotiators alike.270 Competition law (along with
investment, government procurement and "trade facilitation") constitutes
See DINWOODIE,supra note 227, at 1031-33.
See, e.g., U.S.-Sing. Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, 42 ILM 1026.
270 See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, COMPETITION LAW AND THE WORLD TRADE
268
269

(2001); Andrew T. Guzman,
Is InternationalAntitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501 (1998); Eleanor M.
Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda For the WTO: Forging the Links of
Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); Diane P. Wood, The
Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277
(1992); Andre Fiebig, A Role for the WTO in InternationalMerger Control, 20
NW J. INT'L L. & Bus. 233 (2000); Report (1998) of the Working Group on the
ORGANISATION: THE LIMITS OF MULTILATERALISM

Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council,
WT/WGTCP/2 (August 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org.
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one of the so-called "Singapore issues" that have been part of the
developed countries' agenda for the Doha Round of trade negotiations.271
Private restraints on trade can have just as distorting an effect on trade
flows and economic efficiency as state-imposed tariff- and non-tariff
barriers; indeed, one rationale used to justify anti-dumping penalties
27 2
resembles that used to condemn predatory pricing by monopolists.
Moreover, divergences among the substantive and procedural elements
of those competition laws already in existence increase costs and
decrease predictability for both businesses and regulators. 273 Although
some observers are skeptical of the prospects for a coordinated
multilateral solution to the problem,274 developing states' desire to
liberalize trade in the agricultural and textile sectors may affect their
flexibility on this issue.275
In terms of mechanics, a multilateral competition agreement
would likely operate similarly to TRIPS, requiring member states to
establish domestic competition authorities and to enact substantive
competition laws modeled largely after those of the United States and
Europe, which have the greatest depth of experience in administering
such a system. A treaty or harmonization program could start with such
basic principles as the prohibition of price-setting cartels, 27 6 and possibly
progress over time to cover more complicated issues such as merger

271

See, e.g., Naomi Koppel, Developing Nations Want to Drop Issues from

Trade Talks, WASH. POST, August 16, 2003).
272 See PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 247 (3rd ed. 1994).

The comparison between dumping and predatory pricing, however, has been
criticized as misguided. See Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the
Antidumping Laws, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 491,553 (1993).
273 See Sharon E. Foster, While America Slept: The Harmonization of
Competition Laws Based Upon the European Union Model, 15 EM. INT. L. REV.
467, 484-85 (2001)

See Guzman, supra note 272. Guzman argues that countries that are net
exporters of imperfectly competitive (i.e. monopolistically-produced) goods will
prefer laxer competition law standards, while countries that are net importers of
such goods will prefer stricter standards. See id. at 1152.
275 See Foster, supra note 275, at 516-17 (arguing that a customary international
law of competition, based on the EU's competition law scheme, may eventually
act to compel states to act against private restraints to trade).
276 See id. at 485 (emphasizing the difficulty of combating transnational cartels
through domestic enforcement proceedings bound by the limits of territorial
jurisdiction).
274
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review procedures and anti-"tying" rules. 277 One interesting issue in
such a harmonization process would be the court-driven nature of
substantive antitrust law in the United States; drafters of a multilateral
treaty would have to determine how much autonomy to grant the courts
in filling in textual ambiguities, determining violations and crafting
proper remedies.278
In any case, were a WTO-sponsored standard to be established,
and uniform rules to be widely accepted at any level of specificity, the
potential for private enforcement by aggrieved investors through BITs
would be explosive even if the individual states were required to or
agreed to allow for private enforcement actions within domestic courts.
Litigation and adjudication of antitrust cases is notoriously complex and
labor-intensive, and ironically the very institutional incapacity that would
cause many states to fail to meet their enforcement obligations would
inspire foreign investors to reject such states' proffered procedural
remedies in favor of suing the state itself.
On a somewhat more speculative note, the rapid integration of
financial markets suggests the utility of harmonizing securities regulation
and corporation law, a development that could have a dramatic impact on
the minimum treatment standard in international investment law. The
International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), an
international, non-profit association of government securities regulators
and private-sector observers formed in 1983, has led efforts to develop
global standards with regard to disclosure by issuers. 27 9 One of the
IOSCO's key projects has been the formation of a core set of disclosure
standards for nonfinancial statement portions of a proposed international
offering document. 280 This project has met with approval in both the
United States and the EU: the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
in 1999 adopted the IOSCO disclosure requirements for foreign issuers

See id. at 484 (noting the advantages in predictability and in reduced
transaction costs that would result from harmonized or centralized merger
clearance).
277

See Spencer Weber Waller, An International Common Law of Antitrust, 34
NEW ENG. L. REV. 163, 165-67 (1999).
279 See A.A. Sommer, Jr., IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement, 17 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 15 (1996).
211 See J. William Hicks, Harmonization of Disclosure Standardsfor CrossBorder Share Offerings: Approaching an "InternationalPassport" to Capital
Markets?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 361,367-68 (2002).
278
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as part of the U.S. federal securities laws,28' while in Europe, the Forum
of European Securities Commissioners has sought to replicate the
IOSCO standards on a regional basis. 2 " The OECD, whose members
include the states with the most sophisticated financial markets of any in
the world, has been working on the development of model Principles of
Corporate Governance, which include provisions on disclosure,
shareholder rights, and board duties, and which call on the OECD
member states to make such provisions transparent and enforceable.283
The recent wave of corporate scandals on both sides of the
Atlantic,28 4 and the resultant demand by shareholders for greater
executive accountability and more rigorous government enforcement
measures, have spread to other economies less traditionally protective of
shareholder rights. 285 An international standard for securities regulation
might therefore focus on corporate governance issues (perhaps
borrowing from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)286 and disclosure
requirements (possibly modeled after those contained in the Securities
Act of 1933),287 as well as mandating monitoring and enforcement
activity by domestic regulatory agencies.
On the other hand, the SEC's recent woes may end up having a
chilling effect on harmonization efforts in this area, since it has become
apparent that even a highly developed state can at times fall short of its
own basic standards, and a uniform international rule could thus have
some genuine bite. Given the extent of capital inflows into the U.S. and
other major Western economies, and the extremely wide range of foreign
investors holding equity or debt issued by those countries' firms, the idea
of enforcement either through private arbitration or a WTO-like
International Disclosure Standards, Sec. Act Release No. 7745 [1999-2000
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86208 (Sept. 28, 1999).
282 See Hicks, supra note 282, at 369-70.
283 See OECD Website, available at http://www.oecd.org/home.
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Dock, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 22, 2003; Dan Bilefsky, CEOs in Europe Try to
Regain Trust, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2003, at A10.
285 See, e.g., Corporate, Maybe: but Governance?: Patching Up Asian
Corporate Governance, THE ECONOMIST, June 21, 2003; Hae Won Choi,
Foreigners Face Friction in Seoul, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2003; Matt Pottinger,
China Moves to Improve its Markets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2003.
286 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
287 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 (1933).
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proceeding might well prove too progressive a concept. Even leaving the
enforcement issue aside, developed states are less likely to make a
collective push for harmonized securities regulation even in principle
when it is apparent that the burden may not fall primarily on their
developing counterparts.
Other related fields potentially involving state protection of
foreign investors could be similarly subject to harmonization. Foreign
creditors confronting insolvent borrowers would stand to benefit from a
standardized approach to bankruptcy law obligating the debtor's
government to initiate or enable asset recovery proceedings.
UNCITRAL has attempted to respond to this and related problems by
developing a model cross-border insolvency law, 28 8 while similar
harmonization projects have been undertaken in both Europe 28 9 and the
United States. 9 0 Just as Italian officials' administration of bankruptcy
proceedings led the investor-debtor in ELSI to allege expropriatory
action, so might a failure to conduct such proceedings trigger claims by
investor-creditors of violation of positive obligations under this
scheme.29' Similarly, states requiring banking regulators to adequately
monitor the capitalization levels and lending activities of banks would
protect foreign investors from undue risk of bank failure. The Basle
process provides some precedent for harmonization efforts in this
field.29 2 In the cases of both banking and insolvency, uniform
substantive rules could be readily adaptable to the minimum treatment
provision and the BIT enforcement scheme.
Government procurement, mentioned briefly above, presents
another area of regulated economic activity that might conceivably
benefit from further international harmonization. Indeed, increased
United Nations Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, U.N. Commission
on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp.
No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/52/17.(1997).
289 See European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, Official
Journal
of European Communities 160 (June 30, 2000), available at http://
Europa.eu.int/eur-lex.
290 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The TransnationalInsolvency Project of
the
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Although commercial loans and bank deposits are not ordinarily
characterized as foreign direct investment, they are typically included within the
definition of "investments" covered by modem BITs. See, e.g., U.S.-Poland
Treaty, supra note 78, art. 1(b).
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transparency in procurement proceedings, like competition law,
constitutes one of the WTO's Singapore Issues.293 To the extent that
governments are required under prospective harmonized transparency
rules to provide information to potential bidders, such rules could be
viewed as creating positive obligations, and could presumably be
invoked by those bidders on a state contract who have invested financial
or other resources within that state in pursuit of the contract. To take the
concept a step further, a provision could be added obligating the
procuring state to impose civil or criminal sanctions on prospective
contractors who engage in fraud or other unfairly competitive behavior in
the bidding process. A losing bidder could argue that its investment in
the bidding process would be harmed by such fraud, either through the
government's acceptance of the defrauding party's bid or by forcing the
first bidder to expend further resources in pursuit of the contract. A
harmonized enforcement rule would thus appear to fit within the
protective obligation paradigm of the subjects discussed above.
VI.
Implications
The interaction of investment treaty provisions on minimum
treatment and on dispute resolution with the progress of harmonization
programs raises the possibility of a wave of new treaty-based claims by
investors alleging insufficient government intervention into private
economic activity. Under this scenario, states, responding to continued
cross-border economic integration and seeking the perceived mutual
benefits of legal harmonization, will arrive at varying degrees of
consensus as to uniform regulatory "best practices." TRIPS Articles 27
and 28, creating basic standards for patent protection, could be cited as
an example of this step. Subsequently, a foreign investor could conclude
that a host state in which it had established an investment has failed
adequately to implement the uniform substantive standard, e.g. by
refusing to grant a patent for an item ostensibly meeting the required
elements or by failing to enforce the exclusive rights conferred by a
granted patent. The foreign investor could bring a claim under an
applicable BIT, alleging that the state failed to provide the minimum
treatment required by international law, as embodied either directly in
the treaty itself (TRIPS) or in a customary norm (or even "general
principle") generated by the treaty. The investor further alleges, in
addition or in the alternative, a failure to provide "full protection and
Jeffrey Schott, Unlocking the Benefits of World Trade, THE ECONOMIST,
Nov. 1, 2003.
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security" to the investment in the patent, again drawing on the uniform
standard as a baseline for measuring the state's protective obligations.
Under some of the newer investment treaties, the investor might also
allege a failure to enable enforcement of the investor's rights through
court or administrative proceedings.
One open question in such a scenario is whether, assuming that
the arbitral tribunal recognizes the cited treaty or codification statement
as capable of being incorporated into the investment treaty, the
applicable "minimum standard" must be one guaranteeing a remedy or
merely creating an underlying right. For example, although TRIPS
Articles 41-47 (as well as Article 61) obligate member states to provide
for civil, administrative and criminal sanctions for infringement of
various intellectual property rights, the Paris Convention merely defined
several substantive rights themselves without including any separate
terms concerning enforcement. One could, of course, point to language
in such provisions as Paris Convention Article 6bis ("the countries of the
Union undertake.. .to prohibit the use...") and l0bis ("[t]he countries of
the Union are bound to assure.. .effective protection against unfair
competition") as sufficiently indicative of a positive obligation that the
protective standards of the investment treaty's minimum treatment
provision are triggered. Indeed, one would have to adopt a fairly narrow
reading of the term "minimum treatment" in order to conclude that the
creation of a positive obligation requires enforcement provisions as
explicit and elaborate as those contained in TRIPS. It seems at least as
reasonable to view the mere creation of a universally standardized
substantive right (e.g. the right to prevent others from selling items
identical to one's invention), combined with the state's failure to give
such a right practical effect, as amounting to a violation of BIT
obligations.
Whether or not an explicit provision on state enforcement is
needed to enable incorporation of a harmonization device into an
investment treaty, the effect of the incorporation process outlined above
(and in Part IV) will be to transform a series of inter-state agreements
regarding positive regulatory obligations into a source of private claims
against host states. States' engagement in such harmonization programs
could thus engender significant legal, financial and political
consequences beyond those contemplated in the course of harmonization
negotiations. As the gradual proliferation of NAFTA claims against the
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United States 29 4 and the numerous recent criticisms of SEC oversight of
corporate disclosure and investment management 295 make clear,
developed states may be among those subjected to such unforeseen
liability. 29 6 The state-to-state implementation, monitoring, and
enforcement procedures arranged by participants in harmonization
programs will be paralleled-some might say overshadowed-by a
system of ICSID-administered arbitral proceedings.
The net effect of such a development may be primarily positive.
If harmonization of domestic economic laws and policies is considered
generally desirable, then the investment treaties' and arbitral panels' role
in augmenting enforcement of and inducing compliance with uniform
standards can accelerate the process and enhance the corresponding
benefits. Investors, enabled to participate directly in the creation of a
more attractive investment climate within the host state, will increase the
number and variety of their FDI projects, thus furthering the host state's
development goals (at least under a charitable view of the effects of
foreign investment). Meanwhile, governments eager to undertake reform
but worried about potential political fallout will have a degree of legal
cover behind which to operate. Moreover, the inherent limitations faced
by state-to-state monitoring and enforcement regimes such as the TRIPS
council and WTO dispute resolution process-including the financial
burden of maintaining and operating such regimes-will be partially
addressed by effectively "privatizing" the enforcement function.
On the other hand, the incorporation of positive obligations into
investment treaties will generate a number of largely negative effects as
well. The first of these, reduction in state flexibility, is in some sense an
inevitable (and indeed, desired) result of the creation of any enforcement
regime under international law. States subject to the WTO's dispute
settlement system, for example, clearly have fewer options for resolving
emerging economic concerns than they would in the absence of such a
system. In the investment treaty context, however, flexibility is lost
along another dimension. In a state-state system, governmental
counterparts may be able to resolve disputes concerning a given positive
obligation by negotiating concessions in related or unrelated areas or by
294
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simply granting the violating state a measure of leeway. Under an
investment treaty, however, a host state regulatory action or omission
technically in violation of a treaty provision but vitally important for
public policy reasons and unobjectionable to the home state government
will nevertheless face an arbitral challenge often beyond the control of
the home state. The investor, with few interests other than protection of
its investment and thus little appetite for concessions on unrelated
matters, will generally be willing to negotiate only in terms of the
disputed state action or omission itself. The range of options for
acceptable compromise will correspondingly be narrowed, and resolution
through adjudication becomes more likely.
The impact of this reduction in state flexibility may become
particularly acute when positive obligations are created, since such
obligations often impose greater financial burdens on the state than do
negative obligations. For example, an obligation to create a workable
and efficient system of competition law review and enforcement may
prove beyond the means of many developing countries, or might require
the diversion of public resources from areas of more crucial importance
to development.297 This tension can be dealt with in the WTO scheme
through the negotiation of transition periods and by developed countries'
waiver of claims of violation. Were such an obligation to form the basis
for successful private claims under an investment treaty, however, a
developing host state would have few choices other than implementing
the required administrative apparatus, paying a series of potentially large
arbitral awards, or simply abandoning the investment treaty altogether. 98
Another negative effect of incorporation, similarly shared with
other systems of international adjudication, is the potential for tension
between private enforcement of positive obligations on the one hand and
democratic norms on the other. The enforcement of positive obligations
through investor-state arbitration places private arbitrators and private
foreign investors in the role of public policy-makers, replacing state
As to intellectual property law, it has been estimated that the cost of creating
the minimal infrastructure needed to implement TRIPS would cost a developing
country from $1.5 million to $2 million. See The Right to Good Ideas, supra
note 260.
298 See Sydney M. Cone, III - Moderator, Jose E. Alvarez, James
L.
Gunmderson, John R. MacArthur, Steven R. Ratner, Symposium: The
MultinationalEnterpriseas Global CorporateCitizen, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 7-11 (2001) (arguing that creative, high-profile claims such as that
in Loewen might sabotage support for investment treaties).
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authorities' prosecutorial and regulatory discretion with their own
notions of what constitutes a minimal standard of good governance. As
noted in Part III, U.S. courts have disfavored such private compulsion of
government action even within an entirely domestic context.299 When
the private policy-makers involved are foreign multinationals and (as is
typical of investor-state arbitrators) foreign lawyers, and when the
relevant decisions involve not only the operation of state machinery but
the very creation of such machinery, challenges to the legitimacy of the
process are likely to become more aggressive. Should a finding of
violation of a positive obligation coincide with a large monetary award
against a state already in severe financial straits, the option of withdrawal
from either the harmonization process or the investment treaty
framework may prove extremely tempting to the state.
Many of these difficulties could be avoided if arbitrators remain
cautious when interpreting investment treaties and identifying uniform
international standards of regulatory and economic policy. Tribunals
need not adopt as strict a view as that favored by the United States in
Loewen, limiting positive obligations to physical protection against mob
violence and the like. However, in interpreting and applying the terms
"treatment in accordance with international law" and "full protection and
security," tribunals could factor the policy concerns discussed earlier in
this Part into their analysis of the "object and purpose" of applicable
investment treaties. This could be accomplished through a rebuttable
presumption that minimum treatment clauses are meant to incorporate
customary international law rather than external treaties, or at least that
such treaties can be incorporated only when they have been entered into
with a view toward potential private enforcement. It would be plausible
for tribunals to presume that states that accede to a treaty (e.g. TRIPS)
with a discrete, comprehensive enforcement regime do not intend to
enable circumvention of that regime when they enter into subsequent
bilateral agreements such as BITs. Additionally, tribunals could apply a
somewhat heightened standard for the identification of customary
international law imposing positive obligations-perhaps requiring an
explicit statement by signatories to a harmonization treaty indicating
their view that such a treaty codifies or generates a customary rule.
Finally, tribunals could adopt the "subjective approach" to full protection
and security described by the Asian Agriculturaltribunal, as discussed in
Part III(C), finding that the extent of the obligation varies according to
299
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Such
the administrative and financial resources of the state.
"subjectivity" could be extended to obligations beyond those of full
protection and security, including newly emergent treaty-based or
customary norms. Measured doctrinal approaches of this sort would
enable states to continue with their current approaches to investment
treaty negotiation and regulatory harmonization without fear of opening
the floodgates to unexpected arbitral claims.
Absent evidence of such a circumspect approach by tribunals,
however, states would be well advised to take the investment treaties'
positive obligation features into account when participating in
harmonization efforts or when negotiating the BITs themselves. One
possible approach would involve states adding language to the BIT's
minimum treatment clause restricting the definition of the term
"international law" to include only "customary international law" (a li
NAFTA Art. 1105), or even more specifically, including only that
customary international law established as of the time of the treaty's
signing. The "full protection and security" term, meanwhile, could be
defined to cover only protection from physical harm. A drawback to
both of these solutions might require the retroactive amendment of all of
a given state's BITs, lest the broader positive obligation be re-injected
into the BIT via the MFN clause and a separate, unaltered BIT.300
Alternatively, an entirely separate provision could be added to the BIT,
stating that none of the obligations contained therein is to be interpreted
as compelling either party to undertake or enforce any affirmative
regulation of private economic activity. Reopening such a large volume
of economic agreements to renewed negotiation might well prove
awkward and even counterproductive, since parties (particularly
developed states with less to gain from such amendments) might be
tempted to hold out for offsetting concessions and thus paralyze the
investment protection regime.
A third approach states could use to avoid enforcement of
positive obligations incorporated into BITs would focus on the
harmonization process; states involved in such a process would either be
sure to clarify that no rule of customary international law was being
created, or else to include within the resulting treaty or codified set of
rules a provision to the effect that the given document should not be
considered to alter the parties' rights or obligations under any existing or
future treaty, absent consent of the parties to the latter treaty. The
300
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effectiveness of any such solution based on an incorporated treaty or
norm itself would depend on tribunals' views as to the relationship
between such treaty or norm and the intent of the parties to the
investment treaty. If a member of TRIPS, for example, were to sign off
on such a TRIPS amendment, that state's intent could be viewed as
altering (or at least "clarifying") the meaning of its previously adopted
investment agreements and as guiding interpretation of its future
investment agreements. On the other hand, this retroactive approach to
the construction of intent could backfire, since conduct or statements
occurring subsequent to the TRIPS amendment could in theory be
interpreted by a tribunal as reversing or negating such a state's intent as
concerns its investment treaties. Moreover, the situation becomes more
complicated when the rule incorporated is a customary rule based on a
treaty or codification process in which the host state concerned was not a
direct participant. It would be somewhat more difficult to argue that the
intent of the parties to a TRIPS amendment operates to alter the meaning
of an investment treaty entered into by a non-member of TRIPS; if an
original TRIPS-inspired customary rule incorporated positive obligations
into that investment treaty, there is no assurance that a tribunal would
view such a rule as dissolved through amendment.
Finally, host states could attempt to work around the problem by
utilizing concession agreements with investors. Investment agreements
typically focus on treatment of investors once allowed to enter a host
state, but often lack any provisions guaranteeing such admission in the
first place.3 ' This enables a host state to establish a domestic licensing
regime under which explicit government permission is required before
any foreign direct investment can be established. The host state can
make a grant of such a license contingent upon waiver of certain rights,
including rights under international law, through "concession"
contracts.30 2 Abuse of such a scheme, as by making waiver of all

See Vandevelde, supra note 135, at 511. Many investment agreements do
provide for national treatment and MFN treatment with respect to establishment
of investments, though often with exception for specifically listed industries.
See, e.g., U.S.-Sen. Treaty, supra note 136, art. 2(1).
302 See COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 8, at 133-49. Article 42(1) of the
ICSID Convention provides that ICSID proceedings are to apply such governing
law as agreed to by the parties to the dispute; the provision does not specify
whether such rules are to be contained in treaties or investor-state contracts. U.S.
BITs typically include disputes over the interpretation of investor-state
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investment treaty claims, might discourage any foreign investment and
thus defeat the very purpose of entering into such a treaty. However, a
narrower sort of waiver, limited to the disavowal of claims based on
violation of external treaties or of failure to meet positive obligations,
would conceivably be acceptable to prospective investors-particularly
since the novelty of positive obligation claims means that investors
cannot thus far have come to rely upon their availability.
VII.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to demonstrate the means by which
modern international investment law can impose positive obligations on
states as well as negative obligations. Such positive obligations have the
effect not of limiting the state's governance function, but of compelling
the state to be both more vigilant and more proactive. In so doing, these
obligations may not only offend the sovereign sensibilities of both
government actors and citizens, but may also impose an administrative
and financial burden that the state is unprepared to assume. A developing
state, even if willing, may simply not be able to take the steps needed to
implement uniform international standards of intellectual property
protection, competition law enforcement, or other aspect of economic
regulation.30 3 The resulting strain may ultimately generate a backlash
against international investment law that could undermine much of what
the various BIT programs have been able to accomplish. 0 4
Thus, in signing on to investment treaties and then acting to
harmonize domestic economic laws, whether through treaties such as
TRIPS or through quasi-public codification programs, governments may
be tying-or rather, forcing-their own hands to a greater extent than
they realize. It is one thing for states to agree among themselves to
regulate their domestic affairs in a given uniform manner. It is quite
another to empower foreign private parties to sue states who fail to
govern accordingly.

agreements and host state investment authorizations within the scope of the
dispute resolution clause. See, e.g., U.S.-Sen. Treaty, supra note 136, art. 7.
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Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WTO Doc.
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These points are by no means intended as a general critique of
international investment law or as a call for the dismantling of the
modern investment treaty regime. The augmentation of standards both in
the treatment of foreign investment and in domestic economic regulation
will very likely prove beneficial to developed and developing states in
the long run. Indeed, states that are genuinely committed to the
harmonization processes described earlier may welcome the prospect of
a private enforcement mechanism for such positive obligations. What is
important is that states at least be aware of the potential consequences of
these simultaneous trends, and conduct their economic diplomacy
accordingly. Failure to do so could lead to political miscalculation, and
in turn to widespread opposition and even rollback of many of the
system's recent advances. For those encouraged by the field's current
forward trajectory, a cautious approach to positive obligations would
seem to be well worth its limited price.

